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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research was to examine the factors
which motivated managers' choices of transition method for
the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No.

106

(SFAS 106), Employers' Accounting for Post.retirement

Benefits Other Than Pensions.

This statement allowed

employers the option of recognizing the entire transition
amount in the year of adoption or amortizing it over a
future period.

Many opponents of this statement had

expressed concern that the large financial impact brought
about by recognizing this obligation would cause managers to
seek ways to minimize the effect, possibly at the expense of
plan participants.

Since managers had the opportunity to

make a choice of how to recognize this obligation,

there

existed a possibility that managers could use the adoption
of SFAS 106 in attempt to justify plan changes.

Thus,

the

primary question of interest in this research was: "Is there
a significant relationship between plan amendments and
transition method choice?"
In this research, severa1 variables wh ich were spec if ic
to the issue of postretirment benefits
maturity of a firm's workforce,
obligation,

(a ratio measuring

the size of the transition

concurrent adoption of SFAS 109, and the

announcement of plan amendments)

were examined along with

some of the more traditional firm specific variables which

have previously been shown to influence decisions made by
managers.

A sample of 196 firms collected from COMPUSTAT

and NAARS data bases was used and eight hypotheses were
tested using both univariate analysis and logistic
regression models.

Five variables were shown to be

significant to the choice of transition method choices:
bonus plan, early adoption,

industry regulation,

maturity

a firm's workforce, and concurrent adoption of SFAS 109.
There was no evidence that the announcement of plan
amendments was significant to the transition method choice
thus contradicting the theory that firms would use the
adoption of SFAS 106 to justify plan amendments.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The purpose of this research is to examine the factors
which motivate managers' choices of transition method for
the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No.

106 (SFAS 106), Employers' Accounting for

Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions.

In December

1990, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
issued SFAS 106, requiring all firms which offer
postretirement benefits other than pensions
the cost of these benefits,

(PRB) to accrue

instead of the more popularly

used cash (or pay-as-you-go) method.

While having no

direct bearing on the cash flow for most firms, this
requirement does significantly affect the financial
statements of many American companies,1

To ease this

1Total liability for the 500 largest US firms was
estimated at $2 trillion (Cross et al 1989).
The liability
was expected to reduce pre-tax profits by an average of 7.5%
(Berton 1990). Preliminary studies projected that the annual
expense of early adopters will be two to seven times higher
than the previous pay-as-you-go method. (Ernst and Young
1991, Coopers and Lybrand 1989).
Leauby, Ugras and Welsh
(1993) found that OPEB costs of early adopters averaged .66%
of firm revenues (a material portion of the average firm's 5%
operating margin).
l
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offered a choice of two methods of recognizing the
transition {previously existing) obligation.

Firms could

select between recognizing the entire obligation in the
year of adoption (immediate recognition method)
amortizing the obligation over a future period,
exceed 20 years

or
not to

(delayed recognition method).

A unique concern relative to the adoption of SFAS 106
was the potential effect on retiree health benefits.

As

this statement was developed, there was a widespread
assumption that the adoption of SFAS 106 would lead to
reduction or deletion of retiree health benefits
(Henriques,
1993).2

1989; Cameron 1992; Hittelstaedt and Warshawsky

The FASB addressed this issue as follows:

Some believe that employers will change the
designs of postretirement benefits plans or the
way those plans are financed as a result of the
new information about the financial effects of
postretirement benefits. . . . Those actions, if
taken, are not the direct result of a requirement
to accrue postretirement benefits, but rather,
may result from more relevant and useful
information on which to base decisions (FASB
1990) .

2 A survey from KPMG Peat Marwick reports that the
percentage of midsize companies offering retiree health
benefits fell from 44% to 37% between 1991 and 1992.
Among
large employers (1,000 to 4,999 employees) the drop was from
56% to 52%. The survey also reported that retirees are being
asked to bear a substantially higher share of the cost of
coverage.
The increase was 16% for those with single
coverage and 18% for those with family coverage for a four
year period. (Williams 1993)
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In March,

199 3, the Subcommittee on Labor of the U.S.

Senate Committee of Labor and Human Resources held hearings
on the erosion of employer-sponsored retiree health
benefits.

Blame was placed on SFAS 106, the increasing

costs of health care, and the lack of national health
insurance (Rappaport and Malone 1993).
Many firms have reduced their coverage for current
and/or future retirees while other benefits are targeted
for future reductions (Goeppinger and Doebbelaere 1993 ;
Warshawsky, Mittelstaedt and Cristea 1993).

In a study

examining the decision to reduce coverage in employersponsored retiree health care plans, Mittelstaedt,
and Regier

(1994)

Nichols,

found support for three explanations as

to why firms reduce PRB coverage:

increased contracting

cost caused by the adverse financial reporting consequences
of SFAS 106, financial weakness in the absence of SFAS 106,
and firm specific increases in retiree health costs.

While

the second and third explanations concern conditions which
existed prior to the time of SFAS 106 adoption,

the

financial reporting consequences can be directly affected
by the transition method choice.

Managers desiring to

justify plan amendments (in order to reduce costs and
increase income) can show significantly differing PRB costs
depending on the transition method they select.

If a firm

recognizes the transition obligation completely in the year
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of adoption,

it will show a larger expense than will the

firm which chooses to amortize over a future period.3
This presents an opportunity to use financial reporting in
a manner designed to accomplish a desired purpose.

The

extent to which this may or may not have occurred is of
primary concern because it would violate the neutrality of
the accounting information.
To explore these potential concerns,

the following

research question is examined:
Is there a significant relationship between plan
amendments and SFAS 106 transition method choice?
Examination of managers' use of accounting method choice in
new adoptions has been part of many previous studies (Daley
and Vigeland 1983;

Ayres 1986; Imhoff and Thomas 1988;

Langer and Lev 1993; and Ali and Kumar 1993,

among others).

Three primary areas of firm-specific characteristics have
been found to influence managers' choices:
bonus plans and political costs.

debt covenants,

This study examines the

relationship between plan amendments and choice of
transition method in the adoption of SFAS 106, using a
3 Warshawsky, Mittelstaedt and Cristea (199 3) suggest
that if delayed recognition of the transition obligation is
used, the median firm will suffer an 8% decline in after-tax
earnings, while the median firm using immediate recognition
will suffer an immediate 73% decrease from the cumulative
effect of the change
in accounting principle and an
additional 4.7% in earnings thereafter. A median firm using
immediate recognition would also increase the debt/asset
ratio by more than 5%.

model which includes previously established firm-specific
characteristics such as debt covenants,

bonus plans and

political costs, as well as several variables specific to
post-retirement issues.
To address these issues, a sample of publicly-traded
firms was selected from the Compustat and National
Automated Accounting Research System (NAARS) data systems
based on adoption information reported in footnotes to
financial statements for the years 1989 to 1993.

The model

was developed to judge the effect of firm-specific
variables on the dependent variable, transition method
choice.

Univariate analysis was on the independent

variables and logistic regression was used to test the
model.

Financial data was collected from the COMPUSTAT,

DISCLOSURE and NEXIS data bases and from US. Department of
Labor Forms 5500.
Examination of the research question provides
information about the motivating factors behind managers'
decisions in adopting a new standard.

Conclusions can be

drawn as to how managers use allowable accounting method
alternatives to meet individual or firm objectives.

The

significance of this result to the adoption of new
accounting standards could provide a valuable resource to
standard setting bodies,

investors, and stakeholders,

as

well as providing additional material for further research.
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Background of Retiree Health Banafit Accounting
The Social Security Act of 1935 was the first attempt
by the federal government to provide retirement income
security to American citizens.

When wages were frozen

during World War II, employers began to offer privately
sponsored pension plans and health care benefits.

Congress

passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

(ERISA)

in 1974, which mandated reporting and funding requirements
for corporate pension and profit sharing plans, but in
ensuring that commitments made to retirees regarding future
income were secure, the government overlooked other post
employment benefits (OPEB).

Employers continued to view

retiree health care as part of the active cost of having
employees, by including the expense on a pay-as-you-go
basis,

instead of recognizing deferred compensation.

The differences between pension accounting and the
treatment of OPEB became apparent in the 1980s and early
1990s when employers were faced with increasing costs as a
result of three trends:

(l) rising health care costs,

younger retirees and (3) longer life expectancy.

(2)

Since

1980, health care costs in the United States have risen at
an average annual rate of 10.5%.

(In 1987, General Motors'

U.S. health care costs rose by 32% to nearly $3 billion
(Loomis 1989).)

In 1991, the cost of health care in the

United States was $666.2 billion, or 12.2% of the Gross

7
National Product (GNP)

(Koretz 1991).

The Wyatt Company,

an employee benefits consulting firm, predicts that the
entire GNP will be spent on health care by about 2070 if
nothing is done to break the "inflationary spiral"

(Cooper

1991).
In the late 1970s, the FASB became concerned about the
lack of information in financial statements regarding
employer-sponsored OPEB.

They felt that a liability to

employees existed and failure to report this information
could be a material misrepresentation of financial
position.4

Hence,

in 1979 the FASB added OPEB to the

project on employers1 accounting for pensions.

Several

memoranda issued in the early 1980s presented the tentative
conclusion that an employer has an obligation for promised
postretirement benefits (PRB) and that the cost of
postemployment health care and other benefits should be
accrued during the service lives of the employees in order
to properly match the expenses and revenue in the
appropriate time period.

In 1984, the FASB decided to

separate employers' accounting for OPEB from the on-going

4 Martin Dubilier,
of Clayton and Dubilier,
the
leveraged buy-out firm bought Uniroyal for around $1 billion
in 1985.
He later discovered that included in the purchase
was an undisclosed liability estimated at $600 million for
promised postretirement benefits. He is quoted as saying "If
we had known what we were getting into, we would never have
done the Uniroyal deal" (Jereski 1987).
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pension project since members believed that OPEB might be
overshadowed by pension issues.
The Exposure Draft on OPEB was issued in February
1989.

Response was generally favorable, but several areas

were challenged,

including the transition method.

While

recognizing that immediate recognition would give the most
conceptual improvement to financial statements (since it
would bring all companies to a properly stated position and
protect the comparability of statements), the FASB also
realized that the magnitude of the obligation would
possibly distort the adoption year's annual earnings
figures.

Thus the FASB required amortization of the

transition obligation over a 15 year period.

The rationale

stated for this choice was that the understandability and
comparability of financial reports would be improved by the
uniform phasing in of the liability by all employers and
that actuarial techniques are developing and should become
more reliable over time,

leading to more accurate

information during the recognition period

(FASB 1909,

1990).
Respondents were generally in favor of delayed
recognition,

but proposed a longer amortization period.

Nonetheless,

several respondents wanted an option allowing

the use of the immediate recognition method, arguing that
immediate recognition provided a simpler method and could

be justified since a significant portion of the obligation
relates to costs incurred in a prior period

(FASB 1990) .

The Statement, which was issued in December of 1990,
included both of these suggestions.

A choice of transition

method was allowed and the amortization period was extended
to 20 years.

With few exceptions,

SFAS 106 became

effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15,
1992, but earlier adoption was encouraged.
To adopt SFAS 106, employers had to calculate two
amounts:

(1) the accumulated postretirement benefit

obligation (APBO) and (2) the fair value of the plan assets
plus any recognized accrued postretirement benefit costs.
The difference between these two amounts is the transition
obligation and can be recognized fully in the period of
adoption as a cumulative effect of a change in accounting
principle or amortized over the remaining service period of
active plan participants,

to a maximum of 20 years.

Under

either method, the total liability must be disclosed in the
footnotes to the financial statements.

The service and

interest costs for the current year are shown as operating
expenses for each year.
While SFAS 106 has been compared to SFAS 87,
Employer's Accounting for Pensions, in that employers are
required to change to an accrual method of accounting for a
liability,

there is one major difference: most pension

10
plans were pre-funded upon adoption of SFAS 87.

Due to the

lack of tax and legal incentives most firms had not funded
PRB when SFAS 106 was issued.

The pre-funding feature of

SFAS 87 caused many firms to show a positive effect on
income in the year of adoption.5

In contrast,

firms

adopting SFAS 106 experience an income-decreasing effect.
summary
This research examines how the choice of transition
method is affected by firm specific variables, those
previously established in management choice literature and
some specific to the issue of postretirement benefits.
Most previous research on firm characteristics in relation
to SFAS 106 concentrates on early vs. late adopters

(Amir

and Livnat 1993; Amir and Ziv 1994; Leauby, Ugras and Welsh
1993) and on the effect of related announcements on share
prices (Espahbodi, Strock, and Tehranian 1991).

Other

related research attempts to show how the market can
estimate OPEB costs from previous pay-as-you-go costs and
examines the effects of early adoption (Amir 1993 and
Mittelstaedt and Warshawsky 1993).
and Regier

Mittelstaedt,

Nichols,

(1994) attempt to explain why firms are changing

5In studies of early adopters of SFAS 87, Langer and Lev
(1993), Norton (1989) and Stone and Ingram (1988) all
indicated that the majority of plans were funded upon
adoption and the effect on income was positive. Norton found
that
later
adopters
had
similar, but
not
as
large
characteristics.
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retiree health plans.

This current project differs from

the others in that the choice of transition methods is
examined to see if managers use their transition options to
their own advantage or that of their firms.
SFAS 106 has been called "the most significant
accounting change since the adoption of depreciation about
80 years ago" by Eugene H. Flegm, assistant controller of
General Motors Corporation (Berton 1990, p. A3).

Gregg and

Herring (1992, p. 18) call SFAS 106 "the most controversial
statement ever released by the FASB".

Extending the

existing research on the adoption of this statement will
give additional information to the FASB for use in future
deliberations on other heated issues.
This chapter presented an introduction and overview of
the study.

Chapter 2 is a review of relevant literature.

Chapter 3 contains the hypotheses and their development.
The results of the study are provided in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5 contains a summary of the findings and related
implications.

CHAPTER 2

Review of Positive Accountin? Literature

overview
The foundation for this research is the positive
accounting theory which states that managers make
accounting choices based on economic incentives.

By making

choices among alternative accounting practices which are
allowed under generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), managers exercise significant control over
financial statements.

These financial statements can,

in

turn, affect the wealth of the manager, as well as that of
the stakeholders.

As a result of pressures and controls

exerted by stakeholders and other external parties upon
management,

costs arise which have been shown to play a

significant role in a manager's selection of accounting
methods. The costs found to be most significant in decision
making have been categorized as agency and political costs.
Agency costs arise as a result of a relationship that
Jensen and Meckling

(1976) situationally define as whenever

one or more principals engage another person (the agent)
perform some service on the principals’ behalf that
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to
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involves delegating some decision-making authority to the
agent.

Examples of agency costs are bonding expenses,

auditing fees, bonus plans, etc.

Political costs are

attributed to the potential use of power that exists to
affect the distribution of wealth in society,
regulatory agencies or political groups.

primarily by

Some examples of

political costs are taxes placed on certain industries

(the

windfall profits tax on oil and gas enterprises), and
environmental control activities.
Accounting numbers (e.g. net income, debt, equity,
etc.)

are often used as a measuring device by which parties

assess the activities of the firm and management.

As a

result, managers have an incentive to carefully select
accounting methods to achieve desired results.

Accounting

researchers have attempted to determine why managers choose
certain accounting methods over others.

By considering

agency and political costs, researchers suggest three main
hypotheses to explain the differences in choice of
accounting methods by managers: the debt hypothesis, the
bonus plan hypothesis and the political cost hypothesis.
Gordon (1964) and Gordon, Horowitz, and Meyers

(1966)

are credited (Zimmerman 1980, Zmijewski and Hagerman 1981)
with the first serious attempts to construct a positive
accounting theory by attempting to develop systematic
explanations of managers' choices of accounting procedures.
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Their works were based on the income smoothing hypothesis
and on the proposition that capital markets are
inefficient.

Gordon assumed that stock price is a function

of growth and variance in reported earnings and that
managers choose accounting methods in attempts to smooth
net income.
behavior:

Two assumptions were made about managers'
that managers maximize their utility and that

their utility depends on stock price.

Therefore,

managers

choose accounting procedures that maximize growth but
minimize variance in reported earnings,
maximize share price.

Ball

thus attempting to

(1972) and Sunder (1975)

found

that, at the aggregate market level, the market adjusts in
accordance with the efficient market hypothesis and thus,
managers are probably not motivated to choose methods to
smooth income for this reason.
Further analysis of managers' accounting choices by
Watts

(1977), Watts and Zimmerman (1978,

1979), Smith and

Warner (1979), Leftwich (1980), and Holthausen (1980),
among others,

led Zimmerman (1980) to summarize the then

current state of positive theory in three points.
1.

The production process of the firm
requires the combination of various
factors of production which are usually
owned by different parties. . . . The
self-interest of each of these parties
gives rise to a set of agency problems
and hence the view of the firm as "a
nexus of contracts" which is the least
cost solution to the agency problem
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(Jensen and Meckling 1976 and Fama
1980).
2.

Accounting numbers are useful devices
in some of the contracts that are
written to reduce the agency costs of
certain conflicts (Jensen and Meckling
1976; Watts 1977; Watts and Zimmerman
1978, 1979; and Smith and Warner 1979).
In particular, accounting numbers are
used in debt contracts (Leftwich 1980
and Holthausen 1980) management
compensation contracts (Watts and
Zimmerman 1978) and corporate by-laws
(Watts and Zimmerman 1979).

3.

Accounting numbers are also used by
government to regulate and tax the firm
(Watts 1977; and Watts and Zimmerman
1978, 1979). Government regulation
takes two forms. Direct regulation. . .
is the more commonly thought of form. .
. . Besides direct regulation,
individuals using the powers of the
state can transfer wealth from the firm
via affirmative action, OSHA, SPA,
antitrust, price controls etc.
These
latter activities impose what we call
"political costs" on the firm which
managers attempt to reduce via
lobbying, public relations and lower
reported earnings.
Accounting numbers
are often used in these struggles to
transfer corporate wealth.

Studies supporting these early theories have led to
the development of three main hypotheses to explain why
managers make accounting choices:

Watts and Zimmerman

(1986) hypothesized the following relationships between the
accounting method choice theory and related variables:
Bonus plan hypothesis:
Managers of firms with
bonus plans are more likely to choose accounting
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procedures that shift reported earnings from
future periods to the current period.
Debt/equity hypothesis: The larger a firm's
debt/equity ratio, the more likely the firm's
manager is to select accounting procedures that
shift reported earnings from future periods to
the current period.
Size hypothesis: The larger the firm, the more
likely the manager is to choose accounting
procedures that defer reported earnings from
current to future periods, to avoid political
costs.
The bonus plan hypothesis, debt/equity hypothesis and
size hypothesis are related to managers’ compensation, debt
covenants and political processes respectively.

Using the

above theoretical support, studies have been designed
either to explain and predict the choice of accounting
methods in use (e.g. Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979) or to
find the effect on accounting method choice of variations
in the explanatory variables (e.g. Healy 1985).
Researchers have used managers' method choices in several
situations to examine the hypotheses.

Several studies

focus on managers' discretionary accounting choices
Bartov 1993,

(e.g.

Dhaliwal 1980) while others have examined the

activities of managers and firms in relation to the
issuance of new standards or guidelines

(Gujarathi and

Hoskin 1992, Watts and Zimmerman 1978).

The following

discussion of some of the most frequently cited research
studies in positive accounting is divided between studies
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of managers' activities involving discretionary accounting
choices and studies of activities mandated by newly issued
or proposed accounting standards.
Discretionary Accounting Choices
Two frequently mentioned studies which attempted to
explain accounting choice by examining existing accounting
methods are Hagerman and Zmijewski
Hagerman (1981).’
analysis,

(1979) and Zmijewski and

Hagerman and Zmijewski, using Probit

investigated the association between the choice

of a single-accounting method (the dependent variable)
the concentration ratio, profit sharing,
intensity,

risk, capital

net sales, and total assets (the explanatory

variables).
Inventory,

and

Four single-accounting methods (Depreciation,

Investment tax credit and Pension costs

amortization) were used to build four different models all
using the same explanatory variables (except the inventory

Both studies examined the same 300 companies (drawn
from CRSP) using the same four accounting method choices.
In the first study examination of the choices individually
led to the rejection of the null hypothesis (that the model
cannot predict the choice of method better than random
assignment of firms to each method) at the .01, .05 and .10
levels for size, depreciation, and investment tax and
pension choices, respectively.
The 1981 study attempted to
diffuse some of the criticisms of the earlier one by
examining portfolio effects and was able to reject the null
hypothesis (that the model is no better than predicting
equal probability of selecting each choice) at the .001
level.
However, a null hypothesis that the model is no
better than predicting that firms will adopt the most
common strategy, is rejected at the .25 level.
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model, which added effective tax rate).

The dependent

variable was assigned based on whether the accounting
method was income-decreasing or income-increasing (0,1
respectively).
Hagerman and Zmijewski found that the theory was able
to explain some of the managers' choices of methods.

All

models predicted the choice of method better than a model
of randomly assigned firms.

The best result was for the

depreciation method, with an R

of .43

They also found

that larger firms tend to use accounting procedures that
reduce reported earnings,

indicating that the size of a

company has some explanatory power in accounting method
choice.
The study was criticized because it did not include
any variables related to debt covenants and because the
results did not seem to predict any better than the naive
strategy of following the most common method.

(The

depreciation method chosen by 8 5 percent of the firms was
straight-line,

Hagerman and Zmijewski's model was correct

85.33 percent of the time [Watts and Zimmerman 1986].)

The

study also failed to take into account that managers'
decisions are rarely based on a single-method, but are
usually part of a portfolio of accounting methods.
Zmijewski and Hagerman expanded on the previous
research by examining a firms’ portfolio of four accounting
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procedures.

The same

method of assigning

variable was used, resulting

the dependent

in 16 possible portfolios.

Three assumptions were made about the magnitude of the
effect of the methods on the firm's income:
1.

All four procedures have the same
impact on reported earnings.

2.

The pension cost and investment tax
credit alternatives have one-half the
effect of the inventory and
depreciation alternatives.

3.

The effects of pension costs and tax
credits are equal but less than onehalf of the effect of inventory and
depreciation alternatives on reported
income.

Zmijewski and Hagerman added two new variables,

risk and

debt/total assets to Hagerman and Zmijewski's set of
explanatory variables.

Results of the Probit analysis

indicated that all estimated coefficients had their
predicted signs and that size, management compensation,
concentration ratio, and total debt to total assets had a
significant association with the dependent variable.

The

model was most applicable to large firms and those in
highly concentrated industries.

This study provided strong

support for positive accounting theory,

indicating that

firms use an overall income strategy rather than making
choices based on isolated accounting methods.
Press and Weintrop (1990) used a five-strategy
methodology similar to Zmijewski and Hagerman's to assign
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values to the dependent variable.
in explanatory variables,

They made a few changes

incorporating a leverage

constraint from SEC filings, annual reports, and Moody's
Industrial Manuals.

They also replaced the debt/total

assets variable with four different measures.

Their

results show an improvement over Zmijewski and Hagerman
R

(an

of .23 compared to .090) especially when the constraints

defined in the debt covenants were included.
Kelly

(1983) reviewed 14 studies that focused on

manager's discretionary accounting choices and their
reaction to standards.

She categorized the studies into

those that concerned management's voluntary choices to
establish an optimal mix of accounting policies and studies
that concerned corporate reaction to mandated accounting
changes.

In examining studies of discretionary accounting

choices, Kelly used positive accounting theory to define
the central question as:

whether the voluntary selection

of accounting procedures was used to influence the level of
executive incentive compensation or to reduce the
restrictiveness of debt covenants or exposure to political
costs, thereby enhancing the firm's stock prices.
The five studies which Kelly examined concerning
discretionary accounting choice (Bowen, Lacey, and Noreen
1981; Dhaliwal 1980; Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith 1982;
Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979; and Zmijewski and Hagerman
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1981)

supported the positive accounting theories.

As

previously discussed, Kelly included results of Hagerman
and Zmijewski

(1979), which found that the explanatory

variables depended upon accounting method choice.

Results

were strengthened when tests were performed using a
portfolio of accounting choices in Zmijewski and Hagerman
(1981) .
Dhaliwal

(1980) examined the influence of a firm's

leverage on decisions concerning oil and gas exploration
costs prior to SFAS 19.

He used 33 pairs of firms matched

by sales revenue to test the hypothesis that the average
debt/equity ratio of firms using full-cost accounting was
larger than that of firms using the successful efforts
method.

A statistically significant difference was found,

lending support to the theoretical debt hypothesis.
Dhaliwal examined the size effect by adjusting assets of 19
of the full-cost firms to a successful-efforts basis and
found a significant difference in firm size between the two
methods.

He interpreted this result to mean that larger

firms might have been attempting to avoid earnings
variability by using full cost accounting.
Bowen, Lacey, and Noreen

(1981) tested a sample of 91

pairs of firms matched by industry, to see if bonus plans,
bond covenants,

or political costs would affect the choice

of capitalization of interest costs on assets under
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construction.

They expected that firms with bonus plans

and debt covenant restrictions would capitalize interest
while firms facing political costs would not.

Results

confirmed that bond covenant variables and size for all
industries other than oil and gas yielded the predicted
results.
Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith (1982) hypothesized that
percentage of management ownership of a firm would
influence accounting method.

Ownership control was used as

a surrogate for incentive compensation schemes.

They used

the choice of depreciation method as their test variable
for 83 firms.

Results confirmed that the higher the

percentage of ownership, the more likely managers were to
choose an income-increasing accounting method.
Daley and Vigeland

(1983)

investigated managers'

choices to capitalize or expense research and development
(R&D) costs prior to 1974.

Their research showed an

association between choice of method and size (a proxy for
political cost),

leverage, and dividend restrictions.

The

political cost hypothesis was confirmed by results that
indicated that smaller firms capitalized the R&D costs more
often than larger firms,

resulting in higher income during

periods of capitalization.

They also confirmed that firms

choosing to capitalize were more highly leveraged, had more
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public debt, and were closer to dividend restrictions than
those firms choosing to expense R&D costs.
The relationship between debt covenants and accounting
methods was also examined by Healy and Palepu (1990).

They

compared the firms' accounting and dividend responses to an
increase in the restrictions of the dividend constraints.
The hypothesis was that firms subject to dividend
restrictions would,

to circumvent the covenants, choose

accounting methods that resulted in higher net income.

To

test this hypothesis, they used changes in single
accounting method choices to find an association between
changes in policies and dividend restrictions. Their
results indicated that firms cut dividends,

but did not

appear to change accounting methods to bypass the
restrictions.
In an attempt to justify the popular use of debtequity ratios as a proxy for closeness to default on debt
covenants,

Duke and Hunt (1990) sampled 187 companies to

test two hypotheses:

first, that the debt-equity ratio is

positively linked to the existence of restrictive debt
covenants and secondly, that there is a positive
correlation between the debt-equity ratio and the
restrictiveness of several common accounting-based debt
covenant provisions. They examined previous research
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studies which used variations of leverage ratios.

They

calculated seven ratios for each sample firm.
Results indicated a positive relation between the
seven ratio proxies and the existence of several common
accounting-based debt covenants.

They also found

significant correlations between the debt proxies and the
restrictiveness of the most "prevalent type"
covenant restriction,

(p. 59) of

related to retained earnings.

and Hunt concluded that,

Duke

for the extent to which most

researchers wish to capture debt covenant restrictiveness,
a debt to equity ratio is an acceptable proxy.
A recent study by Bartov (1993) examined the effect of
the discretionary choice of timing the disposal of longlived assets.

He examined the debt hypothesis with regard

to income recognition of the disposal.

By taking 653 firm-

year observations from 56 different industrial
classifications,

Bartov confirmed that managers took

advantage of asset sales by timing the sale to mitigate
accounting based restrictions in the firm's debt covenants.
Another type of research is the examination of how
material changes in variables cause a change in accounting
policies.

If the positive accounting theory holds, then

changes in management incentive variables,

in debt

contracting variables or in variables representing changes
in the political environment, will cause firms to seek
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income-adjusting methods.
this theory.

Healy's

(1985) study supported

Healy partitioned the data according to

details of management compensation plans and found that
choices of accounting procedures corresponded to the
maximization of management compensation.
revealed that when

His study

theupper and lower limits in the

manager's income-based bonus plans changed,

managers chose

a set of accounting methods that would increase their
compensation.
Healy used proxy statements to identify the boundaries
of bonus plans.

He divided each company-year into three

portfolios, UPP, LOW, and MID, based on whether the cash
flow from operations exceeded the upper bound or fell below
the lower bound of
binding.

thebonus plan, or where

The mean value of accruals

was

neither was
calculated and

tested for statistically significant differences among the
portfolios.

There was a strong association between the

amount of accruals and the upper and lower limits of bonus
plans.

His results confirmed the bonus plan hypothesis.

DeAngelo (1988) used proxy contests to see if a change
in a firm's board of directors (political environment)

The value of accrual was calculated by totaling
depreciation expense, extraordinary items,
deferred income
tax expense and changes in accounts receivable, inventory,
accounts payable, and taxes payable.
The amount was
further adjusted for bonus-plan earnings definitions.
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caused a change in accounting numbers.

She used a random

walk model to find the unexpected amount of accruals for
the period" to test if incumbent managers exercised their
opportunity to present a favorable picture of their own
performance to voters.

Results confirmed this hypothesis

and also showed that new managers took a "bath"

to

decrease earnings and blame the decreases on previous
management.
Mandatory Accounting Choices
Lobbying Efforts
Research on the effects of a mandatory accounting
change have yielded similar results, confirming the
positive accounting theory hypotheses.

These studies often

examine a f i r m 's activities prior to the issuance of or the
required adoption date of new accounting standards,

by

studying the firm's lobbying efforts and early adoptions.
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) examined whether the effect of a
proposed standard on a firm's income would influence the
firm's lobbying effort.

Using the FASB's discussion

memorandum on general price level adjustments (GPLA), they

’The expected amount of accruals was calculated by
subtracting operating cash flow from the amount of net
income in the period prior to the proxy contests.
The
unexpected amount was estimated by taking the difference
between the expected and actual amounts.
She did not
separate the discretionary and non-discretionary parts of
the accruals.
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examined comment letters and found 3 3 opposing and 18
supporting a change.

Firm size was confirmed as the only

significant factor influencing lobbying position, with
large firms opposing GPLA when the effect was to increase
income.
Dhaliwal

(1982)

studied 44 firms that lobbied on the

FASB's discussion memorandum on accounting for interest
costs.

He wanted to determine the role of agency theory

variables and political costs in lobbying positions.

The

existence of management compensation plans and high
leverage was expected to cause a firm to support interest
capitalization.

Large firms

(a proxy for political costs)

were expected to lobby against the standard.
leverage factor was found to be significant,

Only the
supporting the

debt hypothesis.
Kelly (1983) examined both the lobbying activities and
changes in financing or operating activities in relation to
the proposed standard on foreign currency translation.
Results of a questionnaire revealed that 26 firms made
financing or operating changes while 14 out of the 52
respondents lobbied against the standard.

Firms with

greater incentive compensation and leverage,

larger asset

size, and lower management ownership exhibited more
lobbying activities.
and operating charges.

Large size was related to financing
Firms that were involved in both
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lobbying and changes were characterized by greater
leverage,

larger asset size, and smaller percentage of

management ownership.
Earlv adoption
Many researchers have studied positive accounting
hypotheses by examining a firm's choice to adopt a new
standard prior to the required effective date.

They

hypothesized that a firm will adopt early if there is an
appropriate income-decreasing or increasing effect.
Several recent studies have found results consistent with
the bonus, debt and political costs hypotheses.
Stone and Ingram (1988) obtained survey results from
227 companies that applied SFAS 87, Employer's Accounting
for Pensions, in 1986.

This standard, which required the

recognition of pension expense and liability was,
general,

in

income increasing, due to the funding requirements

of previously existing pension regulations.

They found

that early adoption had a favorable income statement effect
for most firms (101), with only five firms reporting
increased pension expense.
Scott

(1991) examined 279 firms with defined benefit

plans to determine if agency and political cost variables,
among others, were significant in the decision to adopt
SFAS 87 prior to the effective date.

Multivariate logistic

analysis indicated that leverage was not significant to
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early adoption, while univariate tests of leverage yielded
significant results, but an unexpected sign.

He attributed

the absence of the predicted result to the standard's
minimal balance sheet effects.

He tested four combinations

of bonus calculations and boundary limits from firms with
income-based bonus plans.

Results indicated that a bonus

plan is significant to the adoption decision, with the most
significant results being attained where boundaries were in
effect.
Scott hypothesized that the motivation to take a
"bath" is also related to the existence of an income-based
bonus plan.

By including a BATH variable in his model, he

showed the validity of his hypothesis for the early
adoption firms.

He also reported that regulated industries

did not adopt SFAS 87 early and that late adopters were
significantly larger firms than were early adopters.

This

finding was in line with accepted theory that the adoption
was income-increasing and that politically sensitive
industries desired the opposite reaction.
Sami and Welsh (1992) also achieved results that were
consistent with evidence of systematic differences between
firms choosing differing adoption dates.

They posited

that the FASB's policy of flexible transition periods
allows firms to choose "a method of pension accounting that
enhances their financial reports"

(p. 234).

They analyzed
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134 sample firms, 67 early adopters of SFAS 87 and a
control group of equal number of non-early adopters matched
by industry.
Their study differed from previous research in that
they tested the debt hypothesis using dummy variables for
the existence of debt constraints

(on leverage, working

capital, dividend payment and other accounting numbers
frequently used in covenants) along with ratios for
leverage,

interest expense and dividends.

Management-

related variables, size, and pension-related variables were
also included in the model.

Early adopters were found to

be subject to more accounting-based debt constraints and
univariate tests showed significant differences between
groups for dividend pay-out and interest coverage ratios.
These results, which indicated that large firms or those
with large pension plans were more likely to choose incomeincreasing changes, were not consistent with the political
cost hypothesis.

However, Sami and Welsh explained that

results may partly reflect the inadequacy of size as a
surrogate for political cost and that the amount of funding
of the pension plan affected the timing decision.
Langer and Lev (1993) also examined managerial motives
for selecting early adoption of SFAS 87, attempting to
determine the effect of the FASB's multi year adoption
period.

They classified the motives into two groups:
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compliance costs or investor perceptions.
225 firms which adopted

They selected

the standard in 1986 and 1987.

Two characteristics were significant in univariate tests:
leverage and number of loans.

In multivariate Logit tests,

the only variable shown to be statistically significant in
four models was the effect of adoption on earnings per
share.

The results failed to provide strong support for

the FASB's contention that extended adoption periods led to
reduced costs, but appeared to support earnings management
as motivation for timing of the adoption.
Gujarathi and Hoskins (1992) examined the timing of
adoption and the choice of transition method in managing
earnings in the adoption of SFAS 96, Accounting for Income
Taxes.

A sample of 292 firms which adopted the standard

prior to the effective date was selected.

The cumulative

effect method, which altered income in the adoption year
was used by 232 firms, while the retroactive method, which
altered retained earnings in the adoption year was selected
by 60 firms.

Analysis of the effect of the adoption on

income revealed that 158 firms reported a significant
increase in income, while only 22 reported a decrease.

(The

other firms were either deleted from the sample or showed
an immaterial effect.)

Many of those with earnings

decreases were shown to be taking a "big bath", as their
reported earnings would have been negative before the
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effects of the adoption.

These results confirmed that many

firms were choosing to adopt SFAS 96 early to influence
income.
Research on poatretirenent Benefits
SFAS 106 has been compared to SFAS 87 in that
employers are required to account for both postretirement
and pension benefits using the accrual method of
accounting.

There is one major difference, however.

Pension plans have been government regulated for several
years and most were securely funded when SFAS 87 took
effect.

This allowed many firms to show an income-

increasing effect upon the adoption of SFAS 87 (Langer and
Lev 1993; Leauby, Ugras, and Welsh 1993a; Stone and Ingram
1988).

Postretirement benefits have not had the benefit of

tax protection and thus, firms have had no incentive to
advance-fund them.

This situation will cause an income-

decreasing effect for the majority of firms upon adoption
of SFAS 106 (Leauby, Ugras, and Welsh 1993a) .

Many

researchers have replicated the pension studies done after
issuance of SFAS 87, to determine if results are comparable
in the area of postretirement benefits.
Two studies by Leauby, Ugras, and Welsh

(1993a and

1993b) examine the activities of early adopters of SFAS
106.

They proposed that firms adopting early did so in an
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effort to manage earnings.

Three hypotheses were examined

(Leauby, Ugras, and Welsh 1993b, p. 54).
1.
Firms on the lower end of the projected twoto-seven-times increase from prior year cash cost
will be more likely to be early adopters of SFAS
106.
2.
Firms adopting early will have earnings in
the year of adoption below the level of the prior
year.
3.
Firms with a lower long-term debt-to-total
assets ratio relative to the industry average
will be more likely to adopt SFAS 106 early.
Sixty-four firms adopting the standard in 1990 and
1991 were selected from footnote disclosures on Disclosure
Inc.

Firms were then divided into three groups based on

revenue size.

Over 60 percent of the early adopters were

manufacturing companies.

The first hypothesis was

confirmed by results indicating that sample firms averaged
1.64 times higher OPEB costs than under the previous, cash,
method.

This indicated an increase in

costs less than that

of the predicted two to seven times increase
Lybrand 1989; Ernst and Young 1991).

(Coopers and

The authors concluded

that this result reflected that early adopting firms were
those with a smaller increase in costs.

The result may

also reflect actions taken to reduce plan costs by altering
the structure of the plan and its benefits.
Hypothesis two was also supported

since results

indicated that sample firms averaged a

93.35 percent
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decrease in operating income after controlling for the OPEB
cost.

Large firms had the largest percentage decrease in

earnings

(123%).

The authors proposed that these results

support the "big bath" hypothesis, that firms adopted
early in years in which earnings were decreasing prior to
the addition of OPEB costs.
The third hypothesis was supported for small and
medium firms which showed significantly increased debt
ratios. However,

larger firms actually exhibited a decrease

in the average debt/asset ratio in the year of adoption.
The authors attributed this to the flexibility of a larger
company to adjust its capital structure prior to adoption.
One way of managing the impact of adopting SFAS 106
was in the selection of transition method.
and Welsh (1993b)

Leauby, Ugras,

found that only five of the 64 early

adopters chose to defer the costs, with the remainder
choosing to immediately recognize the entire balance.
The cumulative effect of immediate adoption for all firms
was 28.58 percent of pretax income.

The average decreases

in income from the change were: $13,989 million for small
firms,

$44,526 million and $321,224 million for medium and

large firms respectively.

They found that assumptions

about the discount rate and rate of return used to
calculate the OPEB did not vary significantly across firms,
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with assumptions about health-care cost trends covering a
wide range among the sample.
Amir and Livnat

(1992) examined the choice:

to adopt

SFAS 106 or to simply disclose the obligation prior to the
date the standard became effective. The authors also
examined the market reaction to receipt of information
under each method.

They found that the self-classification

of a firm into one of the two groups was consistent with
management attempts to influence investor perceptions.
They also found the average market reaction was more
favorable for adopters than for disclosers.
Nine hypotheses were examined.
1. Firms with lower debt/asset ratios are more
likely to adopt SFAS 106 earlier than other
firms (p. 7).
2. Larger firms are likely to adopt the standard
earlier than other firms (p. 8).
3. Firms with pension plans that have larger net
plan assets are more likely to adopt SFAS 106
earlier (p. 8).
4. Firms with a smaller impact of the standard on
earnings, equity and total liabilities are likely
to adopt the standard earlier (p. 9).
5. Firms with more extreme earnings changes
(positive or negative) are more likely to adopt
SFAS 106 earlier than other firms (p. 10).
6. Firms with greater earnings variability are
more likely to adopt SFAS 106 earlier than other
firms (p. 10).
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7. Financial institutions and public utilities
(regulated industries) are likely to adopt the
standard early (p. 11).
8. Firms with higher effective tax rates are more
likely to adopt SFAS 106 earlier than other firms
(p. 11).
9. a. The stock market reaction to the announcement of
the OPEB liability is more favorable for the group of
firms that adopted the standard than to those that
merely disclosed the liability (p. 20-21) .
b. The market reaction is negatively correlated with
the relative size of the liability (p. 21).
A sample of 133 early adopters and 105 disclosers was
obtained from the National Automated Accounting Research
System (NAARS)and COMPUSTAT data banks.

Three multivariate

LOGIT analyses indicated that the significant explanatory
variables were the impact of the standard on earnings,
extreme earnings changes, regulation of the industry, and
to a lesser extent, variability of earnings and effective
tax rate.

The authors concluded that the decision to

recognize or disclose was not based on compliance costs,
but on management's desire to change investor's
perceptions.
Tests indicated a significant difference in market
reaction to the announcement of the decision to either
adopt or disclose.

There was a positive reaction to firms

announcing early adoption,

indicating that investors did

change their perceptions in line with management
intentions.

This study confirmed a difference in
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characteristics between groups adopting or disclosing OPEB
liabilities and revealed that the market does react
differently to differing choice of accounting methods.
Amir and Livnat (1994) examined the motives of firms
that adopted SFAS 106 or disclosed the OPEB liability prior
to 1993.

Their study also confirmed that early adopters

attempted to manage earnings.

A sample of 88 adopters in

1991, 239 adopters 1992 and 75 disclosers in 1991 was
selected using COMPUSTAT and CRSP data.

Six hypotheses

were developed.
1.
Firms that adopted/disclosed their PRB
liability in 1991 have a more negative unexpected
liability than firms that adopted the standard in
1992 (p. 10).
2. In 1991, extreme earnings of 1991 adopters are
greater than extreme earnings of 1992 initial
adopters or 1991 disclosers. In 1992, extreme
earnings of 1992 adopters are greater than those
of 1991 adopters or 1991 disclosers (p. 13).
3.
1991 adopters and disclosers are more likely
to be early adopters of SFAS 87 than 1992 initial
adopters (p. 14).
4.
1991 adopters have lower financial leverage
and lower ratio of PRB liability to total book
value of equity than 1992 adopters (p. 16).
5.
1992 adopters are more likely to renegotiate
their PRB liability and incur greater
renegotiation costs than 1991 adopters (p. 19).
6.
1991 adopters have lower 1992 financial
leverage than 1992 adopters.
The latter have
lower 1993 financing than 1991 adopters (p. 20).
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Tests of hypothesis one did not yield the expected
results.

Adopters and disclosers in 1991 were shown to

have a larger, but not statistically significant,
unexpected liability than the adopters in 1992.

Amir and

Livnat attributed this result to the possibility of
measurement errors in their methodology and to the fact
that their sample included only early adopters and
disclosers and not those waiting until the mandatory
adoption date.

Hypothesis two was partially supported in

that the 1991 earnings of adopters were significantly
different from 1991 disclosers and 1992 adopters,

but 1992

earnings were not significantly different between groups.
Results of tests were inconsistent with hypothesis three,
revealing that early adoption of SFAS 87 did not lead to
early adoption of SFAS 106, possibly because of the
opposing effects on finaneial statements.
The possibility of encountering recontracting costs
was analyzed in hypothesis four by measuring leverage and
postretirement benefit (PRB) liability ratios.

This

hypothesis was confirmed and the authors concluded that
disclosers and later adopters may have delayed adoption due
to recontracting costs.

Hypothesis five was analyzed to

determine if a firm renegotiated its pension benefits.
Results confirmed that 1992 adopters had larger and
statistically significant renegotiation costs than 1991
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adopters.

They concluded that 1992 adopters had been

substantially more active in renegotiating PRB with
employees.

Hypothesis six was not supported:

results did

not indicate a significant difference in financing between
the two groups.
Multivariate analysis was conducted to consider the
various characteristics simultaneously.

The results were

similar to those of the previously discussed univariate
tests.

Extreme earnings of 1991 adopters,

PRB ratio, and

renegotiation costs were found to be significant.

The

authors indicated that 1991 adopters were motivated to
adopt early for earnings management and lower recontracting
costs, and because adoption had a smaller impact on them
than on 1992 adopters.

The later adopters attempted to

offset negative effects by renegotiating the benefits with
employees.

Market tests indicated that the market

was able to "see through" the attempts at earnings
management and reduction of liability by renegotiations.
Amir and Ziv (1994) examined the motivation to adopt
SFAS 106 early based on a manager's private information.
They predicted that firms whose managers possessed
favorable information would adopt early,

firms with neutral

information would disclose and firms with unfavorable
information would wait until the mandatory adoption date
and renegotiate the liability.

A sample consisting of 103
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1991 adopters,

264 1992 adopters, 76 1991 disclosers, and

75 "late" adopters was selected.

Four predictions were

speci fied.
1. (Liability order) The PRB liability for firms
adopting the standard early is relatively lower
than that for firms disclosing the liability
without formally adopting the standard.
In
addition, the liability of the latter is lower
than the expected liability of firms that wait
until the mandatory date.
2. (Market reaction) On average, the market
reaction to a firm's early adoption of the
standard is positive, and greater than the market
reaction to disclosure of the expected liability
without adoption.
3. (Renegotiations--consistency of assumptions)
Firms waiting until the mandatory date are more
likely to renegotiate the PRB liability with
other stakeholders than those adopting early.
In addition, the PRB of firms involved in
renegotiations is relatively higher than that of
those not involved in renegotiations.
4. At the mandatory adoption date, the average
liability of disclosing firms is higher than that
of firms that adopted earlier. Furthermore, firms
that disclosed information in footnotes are
expected to experience more variation in
liabilities than early adopters. (This prediction
was not analyzed at this point, since data would
be available only after the adoption date.)
Amir and Ziv contended that other factors may enter into
the decision to adopt early.

They included variables to

test the debt, compensation, and size hypotheses in their
model.
Wilcoxon non-parametric and T-tests yielded univariate
test results consistent with predict ions one and three and
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consistent with the debt and compensation hypotheses.
Multivariate tests indicated that size of PRB liability and
the renegotiation variable were significant in the decision
to adopt or disclose.

Results indicated that renegotiation

of plan benefits in order to reduce the size of the PRB
liability occurred more frequently among firms that delayed
adoption.
Tests of prediction two showed that the cumulative
market adjusted returns

(CMAR)

for 1991 adopters was

positive and significantly different from zero. There was
no significant reaction for disclosing firms or 1992
adopters when related information was announced,

indicating

that the market looked more favorably on early adoption.
The authors concluded that the evidence supported their
three predictions and also provided weaker support for the
bond covenant and compensation theories.
Several studies have attempted to predict or measure
the effects of SFAS 106 on financial statements,
benefits and market prices.
Cristea

plan

Warshawsky, Mittelstaedt, and

(1993) examined financial statement effects by

using the pay-as-you-go costs to estimate the PRB
liability.

Their sample consisted of 476 firms that

sponsored retiree health plans and reported pay-as-you-go
costs and 1383 firms not sponsoring plans.
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Wilcoxon rank-sum tests indicated significant
differences between the two groups in four variables
relative to size:
assets,

market value of common stock, total

sales and employees.

Also, results indicated that

firms sponsoring plans had larger leverage ratios and
after-tax earnings than firms with no plans. The sample was
divided into five demographic groups as defined by the
American Academy of Actuaries Committee on Pension
Actuarial Principles and Practices, based on the change in
the number of employees in the period 1986 to 1989 as
reported on COMPUSTAT.

Ratios of accrued expenses and

liabilities to pay-as-you-go costs were calculated for each
group using current expenses and assumptions about future
costs and life expectancies.

Sample firms were then

assigned to a group and the ratios were applied to each
firm's reported pay-as-you-go costs to obtain an estimate
of the effects of SFAS 106
For firms using the deferred transition method,

the

mean accrued after-tax expense was estimated to be $45.0
million,

a decrease in earnings of 35.1 percent.

Firms

using the immediate recognition method had an estimated
mean expense of $31.3, causing a 314 percent drop in the
year of adoption and a 20 percent on-going decrease.

The

mean estimated after-tax accrued liability for both groups
was $274 million,

almost 6 percent of total assets and 17
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percent of the market value of common stock. The mean
effect of immediate recognition on a leverage ratio was a
9.6 percent increase.

Examination by industry revealed

that some industries experience a greater effect than
others, with the steel industry showing a 27 percent
increase in leverage and a 15 percent decline in earnings.
The authors pointed out that although it is expected
that a change in accounting standards should have no
implications, and that an efficient market would absorb all
the necessary information, several findings indicated
otherwise.

They reported that many companies are changing

retiree health plans, bond rating agencies have backed away
from earlier promises not to revise corporate ratings, and
the evidence of financial statement effects has caused some
market reaction.

Their results showed that managers can

influence the income effect of the standard by the
transition method they choose.
The market effects of pronouncements concerning
postretirement benefits were tested by Esphabodi,
and Tehranian (1991).

Strock,

They examined the dates of nine

pronouncement related to, but prior to the issuance of,
SFAS 106, to determine the effect of each pronouncement on
equity prices.

Five hypotheses were examined.

1.
The stock prices of firms providing
nonpension postretirement benefits are reduced
following announcements that increase the
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probability that the cash basis of accounting for
these benefits will be eliminated.
2. The stock price reaction to announcements
related to the proposed standard for nonpension
postretirement benefits is positively related to
the number of current retirees relative to
current employees.
3. The stock price reaction to announcements
related to the proposed standard for nonpension
postretirement benefits is negatively related to
the firm’s debt ratio.
4. The stock price reaction to announcements
related to the proposed standard for nonpension
postretirement benefits is positively related to
the market value of the firm.
5. The stock price reaction to announcements
related to the proposed standard is more
pronounced for firms currently using the pay-asyou-go method for reporting nonpension
postretirement benefits than for the firms using
an accrual method.
An experimental group composed of 14 3 firms was
selected based on the criteria that they offered
postretirement benefits to employees and had disclosed
information in footnotes on the Disclosure data tapes and
that daily stock returns were available on CRSP tapes.
Hypothesis one was tested using the daily stock returns.
Hypotheses two through five were tested using the following
variables: a ratio of current retirees to active employees;
the debt ratio; the market value of the firm; and a dummy
variable designating the use of an accrual method of
accounting for P R B .
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Results testing the market reaction indicated that the
only significant event was the issuance of the Exposure
Draft.

The average three-day abnormal return for the

experimental firms was 3.02 percent.

The tests also

confirmed that the issuance of the Exposure Draft was the
only significant event.

Thus, all hypotheses were

supported only for the issuance of the Exposure Draft.
Another study of the impact of PRB information upon
the market was performed by Amir (1993).

This study was

designed to evaluate accounting methods ex ante using a
ratio of PRB cash payments to retirees as disclosed by
firms in footnotes prior to adoption of SFAS 106.

The

question was to determine if investors underestimated the
full effect of the PRB liability on a firm's value.

Amir

wanted to see if an estimate of the present value of the
PRB liability was "value-relevant" to investors.
A valuation model was derived by using the market
value of the firm along with the earnings per share
(including tax-adjusted PRB cash payments and pension
expense), book value per share, tax-adjusted per share
amount of cash paid by firms to retirees during the year,
tax-adjusted pension expense per share, per share unfunded
pension liability, and estimated PRB liability all deflated
by the book value of equity at time t-l.

The second stage

of analysis included an adjustment to include the PRB
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liability in earnings and book value variables.
was selected by review of COMPUSTAT data.

The sample

The number of

firms used ranged from 243 in 1984 to 313 in 1990.
Analysis of the variables for two periods (1984-1986
and 1987-1990)

indicated that all of the coefficients in

the second period were significantly smaller than those in
the earlier period.

This result supported the indication

that there was a change in investors' perceptions over
time.

In the 1984-1986 period,investors were shown to

underestimate the present value of current and future
health care relative to the later period, when they
translated $1 of cash payments to an average of $13.75 of
obligation. The author suggested the following as possible
explanations:
1. Investors changed their assessment of the
future increase in health care costs.
2. The discount rate changed.
3. Investors updated their assessment of future
PRB payments.
4. Court cases led investors to change their
beliefs about the legal status of the PRB
obligation.
5. Public debate about this issue drew more
attention to it.
When the value of the PRB obligation was estimated and
the relationship between market value and the estimated
obligation was analyzed, results indicated that the PRB
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obligation was value-relevant to the investor in addition
to the cash payment, and that cash payment was not value
relevant when the numbers were adjusted to reflect the PRB
obligation.

This result indicated that investors preferred

an estimate of the obligation that was calculated based on
accounting information to cash information alone.
Mittelstaedt and Warshawsky (1993) examined the
association between PRB liabilities and share prices.

The

sample consisted of firms that offer retiree health plans
and those that do not,
firms for 1986,

A combined sample included 440

461 for 1987 and 484 for 1988 with 203,

207, and 210 sponsoring retiree health plans, respectively.
A model was developed regressing market value of common
stock divided by tangible assets on firm characteristics
representing research and development expense, advertising
expense,

growth,

risk,

liabilities, net pension assets,

and

the retiree health liability.
In tests of the health plan sample, the coefficients
for retiree health liability were significantly negative
for all three years.

The results for the other variables

were generally consistent with expectations. Regression
results for the combined sample were similar:

a

significant difference between years was found for the
retiree health liability.

The authors concluded that the

48
market does value health liabilities, but at an amount that
may be less than dollar-for-dollar.
The market reaction to SFAS 106 in rate-regulated
industries was studied by Khurana and Loudder (1994).

They

hypothesized that the unique institutional setting for
rate-regulated firms implied that a theoretical basis for
predicting either no market reaction or a positive reaction
to the proposed standard.

No effect may occur because some

firms may be sheltered from indirect costs by the ratesetting process and special external financial reporting
procedures.

A positive reaction may arise as a result of

investors' perceptions that accounting rules can affect the
setting of rates causing a positive cash flow.
This study used an interrupted time-series design to
determine the effects of the Exposure Draft on a sample of
113 rate-regulated utilities.

Industry abnormal return was

measured for a three-day trading period around the issuance
of the Exposure Draft.

The average abnormal return was

calculated for each day, then summed for the three days to
obtain a cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR).
weighted portfolio return model

The

(WPRM) of Sefcik and

Thompson (1986) was used to test cross-sectional
differences and the relationships between returns and firmspecific variables:

regulatory environment,

leverage,

size, ratio of pay-as-you-go costs to book value of assets,
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and a dummy variable to show if the accrual method of
accounting for OPEB costs had been used.
The CAAR around the exposure draft issuance was
negative, but not significant,

suggesting that investors in

regulated industries did not view the proposed rules as
having any direct or indirect negative cash flow effects,
contrary to the findings of Espahbodi, Strock, and
Tehranian (1991).

There was a significant negative return

for firms in environments unfavorable to utilities.

The

authors concluded that the cross-sectional differences in
investors'

reactions suggested that the industry-wide

response is a combination of "diverse expectation,
dependent on the expected regulatory action for a given
f irm"

(p. 378).
A study by Mittelstaedt, Nichols, and Reiger

(1994)

examined what determines a firm's decision to reduce the
benefits of retiree health care plans.

Their objective was

to measure the prevalence and magnitude of plan changes and
to identify cross-sectional and time-varying determinants
associated with the decisions.

They examined five

hypotheses.
1. Firms that reduce retiree medical coverage
have higher debt ratios than other firms before
considering the effects of SFAS 106.
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2. Firms that reduce retiree medical coverage
have larger increases in debt ratios from SFAS
106 than other firms prior to reducing coverage.
3. Firms which reduce retiree medical coverage
experience greater financial weakening than other
firms prior to reducing coverage.
4. Firms which reduce retiree medical coverage
experience greater firm-specific increases in
health care costs than other firms prior to
reduc ing coverage.
5. Firms which reduce retiree medical coverage
have lower pension funding ratios than other
firms prior to reducing coverage.
A sample of 137 firms with cuts and 327 firms with no
cuts in retiree health plans was obtained.

Types of cuts

were grouped into five categories: cap employer
contributions,

increase copayment amounts, tie benefits to

years of service, change to a defined contribution plan,
and eliminate/reduce benefits.

The employee affected were

grouped into new hires, retirees,

fully eligible active

plan participants, and partially eligible active plan
participants.

The sample was analyzed and the highest

percentage of change fell in the "reduce benefits, group
not specified" combination (24.8 percent)

and the

"eliminate benefits for active participants and new hires"
(13.2 percent).

The type of industry appeared to be an

important determinant of the decision to cut benefits.
Firms in the consumer goods and capital goods industries
made up 45.3 per cent of the "cut" sample.

Overall, more
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than 42 percent of firms within the capital goods and
transportation industries indicated that cuts had been
made.
The model included two independent variables to test
the contracting cost hypotheses (1 and 2): total debt/total
assets and percentage change in debt caused by the
immediate recognition of the SFAS 106 liability.
financial weakness hypothesis (3)

The

was tested using the

same debt/asset ratio, cash flow from operations,

and

income from continuing operations, both scaled by total
assets.

Two variables were used to test the increase in

health care hypothesis (4):

retiree pay-as-you-go cost

scaled by active employees and percentage increase from
prior year pay-as-you-go costs per employee.

The variables

used to test the pension plan funding hypothesis were
overfunding divided by total assets and a dummy variable
for the existence of overfunding.
Univariate test results supported the increased
contracting costs hypotheses with firms that cut benefits
showing significantly higher leverage and increase in debt.
The leverage ratio also indicated support for the financial
weakening hypothesis but the other variables were
consistent with the hypothesis only for year zero.

The

results for the health care cost hypothesis were mixed and
there was no support for the pension plan funding
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hypothesis.

Multivariate analysis was performed on the

same variables using a logit model.

The results were

consistent with those of the univariate tests.

The authors

concluded that retiree health care cuts appeared to be
driven by increased contracting costs caused by the adverse
reporting consequences of SFAS 106, financial weakness in
the absence of SFAS 106, and to a lesser extent,

firm-

specific increases in health care costs.
The conclusions from the research on postretirement
benefits generally supports the positive accounting theory.
Firm-specific characteristics are shown to be significant
to the decisions made concerning accounting method choice,
specifically decisions to adopt SFAS 106 or to reduce plan
benefits.

The transition method chosen has also been shown

to be a significant factor in managing earnings while
adopting the new standard.
Conclusion
The purpose of this literature review has been to show
the progress of research from the general studies of
positive accounting theory to the more specific
applications in examining the effects of management choice
in the case of the adoption of SFAS 106.

The three main

hypotheses of positive accounting relating to management
compensation (bonus plan), debt covenant, and size
(political cost) have been generally supported.

Various
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studies have shown that decisions are based on a portfolio
of information and choices, and that,

in each instance,

variables specific to the accounting choice may be as
influential as the three variables usually associated with
theory.
Several limitations can be found in the studies of
earnings management and positive accounting theory.

Most

authors include evaluations of the problems encountered in
their own research.

Several researchers have presented

review articles discussing the common problems.
and Wilson

McNichols

(1988) show that studies of earnings management

can produce potentially misleading results under either of
two conditions:

1. using non-discretionary accruals which

are correlated with the variable used to partition the
samples and 2. using discretionary accruals measured with
e r ror.
Shipper

(1989) relates these two problems to test bias

and power. She indicates that bias is the question of
whether observed results are due to earnings management or
to the economic conditions that affect the correlation
between the partitioning variable and discretionary
accruals.

The lack of power will determine whether the

approach has the ability to detect earnings management
among the other activity present in the findings.
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Watts and 2 immerman (1990) also addressed the lack of
power, attributing it to problems in research methodology
rather than to a deficiency in positive accounting theory.
They identify two major research issues: the lack of power
of the tests and alternative explanations for the empirical
regularities.

They make the following observation (p. 143)

The research method issues are important and
future research must attempt to address them.
However, it is unlikely that the positive
accounting literature . . . w i l l ever totally
eliminate such issues.
They do suggest that research can be improved by improving
the linkage between the theory and empirical tests,
developing theoretical and empirical models to sort out
endogeneity problems among the variables and to reduce
♦measurement errors in accruals to increase the test's
p o wer.
Kelly (1983) discussed observation error and
measurement error in the research studies that she
reviewed.

Observation error arose largely due to the

difficulties in isolating the effects of systematic
economic changes.

Measurement error occurred because of

problems in operationalizing independent variables.
was optimistic about future research,

indicating that

advancements could be made through theoretical and
empirical refinements.

She
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As research continues,

improvements are made.

Each

study increases the body of knowledge and each makes an
advancement in understanding of positive accounting theory.
Shipper

(1989, p 91) directs our thinking as to the purpose

of this research:
By focusing on the costs and benefits of allowing
for managerial discretion in the choice and
application of accounting methods, researchers
provide a framework for considering what we would
have to give up to eliminate earnings management
. . . (and facing) the possibility that earnings
management has the essentially beneficial role of
providing a means for managers to reveal their
private information.

CHAPTER 3

Research Methodology
This chapter develops the research methodology which
is utilized in this study.

This includes discussion of the

research question and hypotheses development, which is
based on the literature reviewed in the previous chapter.
Also included are: the model, the sample selection and the
data collection methods.
Research Question
The majority of studies reviewed have indicated that
the existence of, or size of, certain characteristics will
lead managers to choose accounting methods to meet desired
goals.

By managing earnings, managers can improve their

personal wealth or the financial position of their firms.
Positive accounting theory says that managers will
select income increasing accounting methods whenever
possible to maximize their own wealth
1986).

(Watts and Zimmerman

SFAS 106 has been shown to be generally income

decreasing.

By studying the adoption of SFAS 106, which

gives managers a choice between immediately recognizing the
transition obligation or amortizing it over a future
period,

the tenets of positive accounting can be tested in

a reversed,

income decreasing, situation.
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The research question is derived from the expectations
surrounding the issuance of SFAS 106.

Since the new

standard requires recognition of an expense and liability
that companies would not have recognized until actually
paid, a new financial burden was created.

One obvious

reaction to the standard was a fear that companies would
immediately seek to reduce postretirement benefits to
decrease the cost of plans.
By placing the blame on SFAS 106, companies could use
the adoption and related financial impact as an excuse to
decrease the expense and liability of PRB.

Since managers

have a choice of transition methods, they could choose the
one which would present the best financial position to
justify the desired changes in plan benefits.

The primary

research question is:
Is there a significant relationship between plan
amendments and SFAS 106 transition method choice?
Responses to the research question will add to the body of
information available as to how managers use accounting
methods to manage the reported earnings of the firm.
Hypotheses Development
Eight hypotheses are developed to explore the answers
to the above research question.

The first seven hypothesis

examine various firm-specific characteristics.

The last

58
one deals with the issue of plan amendments and transition
method choice.
Bonus Plan Hypothesis
Management compensation plans are designed to
provide managers with incentives to maximize firm value and
improve their personal financial position at the same time.
Often these compensation contracts specify the payment of a
bonus based on reported financial earnings.

Since the

adoption of SFAS 106 allowed managers to control the effect
on the firm's earnings, the presence of a bonus plan might
have influenced the transition method choice.
The bonus plan hypothesis of positive accounting
theory contends that managers of firms with income-based
bonus plans will choose accounting methods that are incomeincreasing.
results.

Tests of this hypothesis have yielded mixed

Support was found by Healy (1985); Scott

Hagerman and Zmijewski

(1979)

(1991);

(with the depreciation

choice); and Zmijewski and Hagerman

(1981)

(Table 3.1).

These studies found that a variable representing

the

existence of a bonus plan was significant in a model of
accounting method choice.

Healy and Scott tested

variations of the bonus plan formula, using combinations of
plans where income limits were observed.
managers whose firms'

They found that

income had exceeded the upper or

lower limits set by the bonus plan contracts were more
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likely to

choose income-decreasing accruals than those

where the bounds were not exceeded.
Bowen, Lacey, and Noreen (1981); Dhaliwal

(1982);

Kelly (1983); and Watts and Zimmerman (1978) found
insignificant results in testing the bonus plan hypothesis.
Results from these studies were inconclusive as to the
importance of a bonus plan in managers' choices.

They did

not find support for the theory that managers would seek
income-increasing accounting methods in the situations
tested.
Since SFAS 106 does not offer an income-increasing
situation,

the bonus plan hypothesis would suggest that

managers would seek ways to minimize the effect of the
standard.

The most obvious choice for a manager would be

to choose the amortization method of recognizing the
transition obligation to defer much of the expense to
future periods.

However, other research concerning the

"big bath" effect might contradict this idea.
The "big bath" theory holds that if a firm is going to
experience a loss in income, then managers will increase
the loss by including all expected future losses so that
they can protect future periods' earnings by taking a "big
bath'* in the current period.

The "big bath" theory has

been explored in both the popular press and academia

(See:
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Burton and Miller 1986, Greene 1986, Elliott and Shaw 1988,
among others).
Healy

(1985)

found support for this theory in

measuring the effect of bonus plan boundaries.

He

confirmed that when the lower income limit of a bonus-plan
formula cannot be achieved, managers would desire to take
the "big bath*' and protect future earnings.
included a variable, BATH,

Scott

(1991)

in his model to test the

motivation of managers to take a "bath" in earnings.

He

found that this variable was significant to the decision to
adopt SFAS 87 early.
In summary,

results of previous research have

generally supported the bonus plan hypothesis,

indicating

that managers usually seek income-increasing accounting
methods.

However, SFAS 106 is generally income-decreasing,

which should indicate that managers would not have an
incentive to use the adoption to manage earnings, but the
"big bath" theory supplies the reason that managers might
desire to take a large income reduction, such as the
immediate recognition method would provide.

Therefore,

following hypothesis is proposed for this research:
H]: The presence of an income-based bonus plan
is significant to the choice of transition method
in adopting SFAS 106.

the
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Eebt Hypothesis
A debt covenant is a controlling mechanism designed to
protect a debtholder's ownership interest in a firm.

These

covenants place restrictions on management activity after
debt is issued by a corporation.

Often these covenants are

stated in terms of the reported accounting numbers,
ratio of debt to equity or earnings.

such as

Violation of these

covenants would place a firm in technical default and
because of this costly result, managers,

according to

positive accounting theory, will choose accounting
procedures which reduce this possibility.

Since

recognition of the transition liability of SFAS 106 will
decrease a firm's earnings and increase liabilities,
managers can exert control over the accounting numbers by
their selection of transition method and, also, control the
possibility of default.
The debt hypothesis of positive accounting theory
suggests that the larger a firm's debt/equity ratio, the
more likely a manager to choose accounting methods that
shift earnings to the current period.

Begley

(1990 p.

126)

explained that this hypothesis is actually a joint
hypothesis which ties the debt/equity or leverage ratio to
a the possibility of default on debt covenants.

She

hypothesized that the debt/equity ratio is positively
related to closeness to accounting-based covenants, which
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represents the probability of default on these covenants.
As the probability of default increases, the more managers
are likely to choose income-increasing accounting methods.
Begley confirmed this with results showing that firms with
debt covenants based on accounting numbers are more likely
to select income and asset increasing procedures.
Many early studies supported these theories and
indicated that leverage was a significant variable in
managers' accounting method choices.
Noreen

(1981); Daley and Vigeland

Bowen, Lacey, and

(1983); Dhaliwal

(1980,

1982); and Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) were among the
early researchers that found support for the debt
hypothesis

(Table 3.2).

Kelly (1983) found support when

testing lobbying activities surrounding implementation of
foreign currency translation, but no support
for changes in operating activities.
(1990)

Healy and Palepu

did not find support for the debt hypothesis when

testing managers' changes in dividend constraints.
The type of research method used to test the debt
hypothesis has been the subject of some recent studies.
Christie

(1990) provided three formal statistical test on

an aggregation of studies of accounting choice:
square, asymptotic and a Bayesian test.

chi-

He was able to

conclude that there was support for the debt hypothesis.
Duke and Hunt

(1990) examined the relationship between debt
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covenant restrictions and the debt/equity proxy.

They

found that there was a positive relation between the seven
debt proxies examined and several common restrictions.
They concluded that a debt-equity ratio was a sufficient
proxy, especially for capturing a retained earnings
restr iction.
Research on the debt hypothesis in relation to SFAS
106 has yielded mixed results.
Tehranian

Espahbodi,

Strock and

(1991) did not find support a leverage variable

when testing for market reaction surrounding announcements
about accounting for postretirement benefits,

Amir and

Livnat in their 1992 study on early adoption of SFAS 106,
did not find any support.

In their 1993 study, they did

not find support for unexplained liabilities,

but they did

find support for leverage when measuring recontracting
costs.
In contrast, Sami and Welsh (1992) and Leauby, Ugras,
and Welsh (1993b)

found support for the significance of the

debt variable in their research concerning early adoption
of SFAS 106.

Warshawsky, Mittelstaedt,

and Cristea

(1993),

in their research estimating postretirement benefit
liability,

found that leverage was a significant variable

between firms sponsoring plans and those which did not*
Mittelstaedt, Nichols and Reiger (1994) also found the
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leverage variable to be significant in their study of firms
which made reductions in their postretirement benefits.
The debt hypothesis would indicate that managers would
prefer to report a larger income in the current period.

In

adopting SFAS 106, this would best be accomplished by use
of the delayed recognition method.

This would allow the

smallest charge to income in the current year.

Thus, the

following hypothesis is proposed:
H, : Firms with high leverage will choose the
delayed recognition method of adopting SFAS 106.
Political Cost Hypotheses
Political costs arise when a regulatory body
influences a firm to take some action, either to avoid
government interference or to meet requirements which have
been imposed.

A firm's financial figures play an important

role in the determination of political costs.

First, large

figures can send signals to political groups that there are
reasons for politicians to intervene (e.g. to avoid
possible monopoly or to insure social or environmental
responsibility).

Second, accounting information is often

used to regulate the firm (such as in setting rates,
imposing new taxes and determining the type of service
offered).

By selecting appropriate accounting procedures,

managers are able to send signals to political bodies and
also to manipulate the regulating process.

The political
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cost hypothesis,

often called the size hypothesis because

of the frequent use of the size variable as a proxy for
political cost,

indicates that managers will select income-

decreasing accounting methods to avoid political costs.
Thus, the managers of larger corporations should choose the
immediate recognition method of adopting SFAS 106 in order
to minimize income and avoid political costs.
Several firm specific characteristics have been
suggested to represent the potential for political costs.
This research examines firm size, early adoption, and
industry.

These are discussed in the following sections.

Firm Bis*
The most often examined political proxy is firm size.
Larger corporations are expected to draw more political
attention and thus, have more of their income appropriated
by the system.

Hagerman and Zmijewski

(1979),

in the test

of depreciation choices, and Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981)
confirmed the hypothesis that large firms face political
costs which they attempt to minimize by reducing net
income,

in their research on managers' choices of income

increasing and decreasing accruals.

When examining

inventory choices, Hagerman and Zmijewski

(1979) did not

find support.
Watts and Zimmerman (1978),

in their study of lobbying

efforts and general price level adjustment requirements,
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found that firm size had the most discriminating power of
the variables tested.

Bowen, Lacey, and Noreen

(1981);

Daley and Vigeland (1983); Dhaliwal (1980); and Kelly
(1983) all find support for the significance of size in
accounting method choice (Table 3.3).

Each of these

studies examines firm specific variables and managers'
choices and confirm the size hypothesis.
(1982)

However, Dhaliwal

found conflicting evidence in his study of managers'

choices of accounting for interest costs.
In research on adoption of new standards, similar
results have been found.

Sami and Welsh

(1992)

found that

early adopters of SFAS 87 were larger in size than those
that chose to disclose or delay adoption.

They

hypothesized that larger firms are more likely to adopt
early because they have the resources necessary to
implement a change.

Their results, however, were

inconsistent with the usual explanation of the political
cost hypothesis, which indicates that large firms will be
unlikely to choose income-increasing accounting changes.
They explained that the results were consistent with those
obtained by Senteney and Strawser

(1990), who found that

early adopters of SFAS 87 were more likely to be large
firms with more fully funded plans.

Sami and Welsh

suggested that the information costs and income increasing
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effect are offsetting factors which lead to early adoption
by large firms.
Since SFAS 106 has income decreasing effects and most
postretirement

(PRB) plans are unfunded, the size

hypothesis should be supported in tests of adoption.
Consequently, managers may seek to decrease income to avoid
political costs, by using the immediate recognition method
to achieve the maximum possible reduction.

Espahbodi,

Strock and Tehranian (1991) found size to be a significant
factor in their study of market reaction to announcements
concerning postretirement benefits,.
Mittelstaedt,

and Cristea

Warshawsky,

(1993) also found that size was

important in studying companies that sponsored
postretirement benefit plans.
Amir and Livnat (1992) did not find support for the
size hypothesis in their examination of early adopters of
SFAS 106.

They hypothesized that large firms were more

able to reduce the cost of calculating the necessary
information needed to adopt and were better able to absorb
the cost.

These firms would be able to reduce political

costs by reducing earnings and equity.

They did find

significant difference in firm size between early adopters
and others,

however, the sign of the coefficient was

opposite to their original predictions.

Amir and Livnat

suggested that the impact of adoption on large firms may
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have been financially greater than expected, causing them
to delay adoption until reviews could be made.
was in line with the pension research

This result

(Senteney and

Strawser 1990) which indicated that the more funded plans
adopted early and while size was important, the amount of
unfunded liability caused a reverse action.
The results of pension and PRB research indicate that
large firms may not adopt early, but that size is
significant in managers' decisions.

The political cost

hypothesis dictates that managers' will seek to reduce
costs to avoid political costs, therefore,

to achieve

maximum reduction of income, managers would be expected to
use the immediate recognition method of adoption of SFAS
106.
H,: Large firms will choose to immediately
recognize the OPEB transition obligation.
Early Adoption
Although Amir and Livnat

(1992) did not find the firm

size test to yield the expected results, they did find
other significant results.

They argued that the decision

to adopt SFAS 106 early was related to management's desire
to "change investors' perceptions" about the financial
position of the firm.

By adopting the standard early, and

taking immediate write-off of the transition obligation,
managers intend to convey the healthy state of the firm, as
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well as to avoid political costs.

For example,

IBM took a

$2.6 billion earnings write-off in the first quarter of
1991.

Analyst Philip C. Ruepper of Sanford C. Bernstein

and Co. stated that IBM's move was to show that the ruling
was "not a big deal for them"
1992).

When GE announced,

(Light, Holland, and Kelly

in 1991, an aftertax charge of

$1.8 billion applied to the first quarter earnings,

this

approach seemed successful as stock prices rose by $2 per
share

(Light, Treece, and Driscoll 1991).
Capital markets are expected to see through accounting

manipulations,

including adoption of SFAS 106, when there

is no effect on cash flow, and share prices should not feel
the effects.

However, Amir and Livnat

(1992) found a

positive market reaction to firms which adopted early over
those which chose to disclose.

This result indicated that

managers are able to send a positive signal by adopting
early and taking the immediate write-off of the transition
obligation.

Gujarathi and Hoskin

(1992) also found that

adoption timing plays an important role in earnings
management.

In their study on the adoption of SFAS 96

(Accounting for Income Taxes), they concluded that firms
use the timing of adoption, as well as the choice of
transition method to manage earnings.
Leauby, Ugras,

and Welch (1993b) found that transition

method and timing of adoption were related.

In a study,
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which examined only early adopters, they found that 92% of
early adopters used the immediate recognition method.
another study of early adopters, Amir and Ziv (1994)

In
found

that firms which delayed adoption often incurred more
renegotiation of plan benefits in order to reduce the size
of the liability,

indicating that later adopters seek to

postpone recognition of costs.
This research examines a sample of firms which is
selected from all SFAS 106 adopters.

The results are

expected to be consistent with previous research which
included only early adopters and disclosers.

Firms that

adopted early were expected to reduce income by taking the
largest possible reduction in income through the immediate
recognition method.
H 4: Firms which adopt SFAS 106 early will choose
to immediately recognize the OPEB transition
obligation.
Industry Membership
Membership in certain industries
transportation, etc.)
costs.

(utilities,

is also associated with political

These costs may arise as a result of direct

regulation or of indirect control by political groups over
the industry.

Industries which are regulated by

governmental agencies will have increased costs as a result
of direct instruction by the governing bodies as to
accounting methods to be used or rates to be assessed.
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Indirect regulation may be experienced by some industries
which arouse public interest because of the product
involved, the amount of profit earned or activities which
have been undertaken by the firm (e.g. oil and gas
companies,

automotive, etc.).

Costs also arise as a result

of antitrust activities, union representation, price
controls,

social responsibility pressures and other

interventions by public interest groups.
Kelly (1983) states that firms in industries which are
open to political costs would seek income-reducing
accounting methods.

Regulated industries would desire

income reduction in the hopes of gaining a rate increase,
while indirectly sensitive industries would seek to reduce
income in hopes of reducing political costs.

Managers of

politically regulated or politically sensitive firms should
seek to implement accounting methods which will reduce
income.

In adopting SFAS 106, these managers would be

expected to choose the immediate recognition method to
maximize the decrease in income and, thus, political costs.
Research examining the significance of industry
membership has not been conclusive.

Watts and Zimmerman

(1978) did not find industry to be significant in their
study of lobbying on general price level adjustment
requirements.

Bowen, Lacey, and Noreen (1981)

found

support for the significance of indirect political costs on
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members of a politically sensitive industry, oil and gas
companies.

They reported that members of this industry

expensed interest costs while firms in other industries
capitalized the same costs.

Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981)

found that the sign of the maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE)

indicated that firms in more concentrated industries

(those in which a few firms have a major percentage of
revenue)

tend to adopt accounting strategies which reduced

net income.
In studies examining the adoption of new standards,
results have been more consistent.

Scott

(1991) reported

that regulated industries did not adopt SFAS 87 early.
This finding was in line with accepted theory that the
adoption was income-increasing,

and that politically

sensitive industries desired the opposite reaction.
and Ingram (1988) and Gujarathi and Hoskin (1992)

Stone

included

examinations of industry effects in research on early
adoption of SFAS 87 and SFAS 96, respectively.

Both find

that there are patterns among industries, but the effects
are not significant to the final models.
Amir and Livnat (1992) found that politically
regulated firms did not adopt SFAS 106 early.

This

reaction was unusual in that the effect of SFAS 106 is, in
general,

income-reducing.

They proposed that this result

is explained by the nature of the political process of a
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regulated industry.

An increase in expense is accepted by

these firms in hopes of gaining a rate increase.

There is

a time delay in which the firm must petition their
governing body, and therefore, the regulated firms were not
in a hurry to adopt a new standard until they had received
a ruling on rate increases.

This theory seems to have been

confirmed by recent rulings handed down by the FCC and
public utilities regulating boards stating that companies
cannot pass increased costs along to their customers
(Employee Benefit Plan Review 1993, Williams 1993).
Kharana and Loudder

(1994) performed a study on the

market reaction to SFAS 106 in rate-regulated industries to
see if these firms were protected by the rate-setting
process.

They found a negative, but not significant effect

for their sample of firms at the issuance of the exposure
draft.

A significantly negative reaction was found for the

subsample of firms operating in an environment which was
unfavorable to utilities.
Mittelstaedt, Nichols and Reiger

(1994)

found

industry to be a significant factor in their study of firms
which cut postretirement benefits.

Firms in the consumer

goods and capital goods industries made up 45.3 percent of
the sample of firms cutting plan benefits.
and Welsh (1993b)

Leauby, Ugras

found in their examination of early
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adopters of SFAS 106, that over 60 percent were
manufacturing firms.
These recent studies on the effects of the industry
membership of a firm on the adoption and implementation of
SFAS 106, and other new standards,

indicate that the type

of industry may be important to managers' accounting method
decisions.

The standard political cost theory states that

managers will seek to reduce income to minimize political
costs.

This would indicate that managers,

in adopting SFAS

106, would prefer to use the immediate recognition method.
However,

in the case of certain industries, there may be

other motivations present.

For example, some firms might

seek to take a "big bath" to justify a rate increase, plan
cuts, or to avoid unwanted political attention.

Other

firms, knowing that their regulating bodies will not
approve rate increases or plan cuts, might choose to spread
the impact over future periods.
following hypothesis is proposed,

For this research,

the

following the theory of

the political cost hypothesis:
H. : Firms in regulated or politically sensitive
industries will choose to immediately recognize
the OPEB transition method in adopting SFAS 106.
Postretirement Benefit Related Hypotheses
SFAS 106 was issued in December of 1990.
companies this standard took effect in 1993.

For most
Several

researchers have published studies examining the early
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adoption of SFAS 106 (Amir 1993, Espahbodi,

Strock and

Tehranian 1992, Khurana and Loudder 1994, Leauby,
Welsh 1993a and 1993b).

Ugras and

In this section, hypotheses

directly related to SFAS 106 and postretirement benefits
are addressed.
Work Fore* Maturity
Espahbodi, Strock and Tehranian (1991) examined the
impact on equity prices of nine pronouncements related to
the proposed standard on PRB.

Their study indicated that

the market showed a significant reaction only on the date
of the issuance of the exposure draft. The negative
abnormal returns were most pronounced for firms with few
retirees relative to current employees, along with high
leverage,

small size and firms using the cash basis of

reporting PRB.

They concluded that the maturity of the

work force was important to investors.
A firm with a more mature work force (more retirees
than current employees) may face a greater impact from SFAS
106, than a firm with a less mature work force.

This may

occur because the amount which had been earned by and
promised to the retirees over their active work period had
never previously been recognized on financial statements.
The liability for current employees is incurred as they
work and will be recognized over their employment period.
Thus, a firm with a mature work force may choose to
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amortize the transition obligation to spread the impact
over future periods.
On the other hand, a mature work force may indicate a
mature firm.

A mature firm may have been in business for

many years and have a stable financial situation.

The

mature firm may be in a position to absorb the entire
transition obligation at once by using the immediate
recognition method.
Since the research by Espahbodi,
(1991)

Strock and Tehranian

showed that work force maturity was important to

investors, then it may also be important to managers in
making their transition method choice.

There is no

previous research or theory to imply the direction that a
manager is expected to take, so a two-tailed hypothesis is
presented.
H, : Work force maturity will be a significant
factor in a manager's choice of transition method
in the adoption of SFAS 106.
Statement of Financial Accounting standards No. 109
The obligation to report OPEB and the potential for
future funding of the benefits will have an effect on
related income tax accounting.

The FASB has again revised

the method of accounting for deferred taxes in Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 109 (SFAS 109),
Accounting for Income Taxes.

This statement has been

referred to as the companion to SFAS 106 (Ourusoff and
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Panchapakesan 1992).

While SFAS 106 requires employers to

account for the future cost of PRB as services are
performed,

instead of when cash is paid, SFAS 109 allows

employers to offset the liabilities with a deferred tax
asset.
Allan and Surdick (1993) examined the effects of SFAS
109 on SFAS 106.

They rationalized that if an employer

elects immediate recognition of the PRB transition amount,
the deferred tax asset reported on the balance sheet will
reflect the full tax impact at the date of adoption, thus
making this a very significant asset,
dollar amount.

in terms of the

Companies which record large expenses,

relative to cash outlay, may benefit from adopting SFAS
109, particularly if they have no taxable differences to
offset

(Wilson 1992).

Managers may choose to adopt SFAS

109 at the same time as adopting SFAS 106 in order to
manage the earnings.
If a manager can benefit by adopting SFAS 109 to the
extent of the transition expense, the immediate write-off
method might be chosen.

The following hypothesis is

proposed:
H : Firms adopting SFAS 109 in the same year as
SFAS 106 will use the immediate recognition
method in adopting SFAS 106.
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Plan Amendments
A survey by A. Foster Higgens, a consulting firm,
found that many corporations used SFAS 106 as an excuse to
cut their retiree benefits (Cameron 1992).

Two-thirds of

major corporations have already curtailed retiree health
plans or plan to do so, with more raising premiums,
deductibles or eligibility rules.

Over one-third were

making changes primarily to reduce their liability under
SFAS 106 (Cameron 1992).

Potential changes include:

Different eligibility requirements,

1)

2) Different provisions

for dependent coverage, and 3) A link in the level of
benefits to an employee's years of service at retirement
(Beck and Cohen 199 3).
Another survey by William M. Mercer,

Inc.

indicated

that 50 per cent of the surveyed firms are increasing
employee contributions,

34 per cent have tightened

eligibility standards, and 26 per cent have caps on company
contributions (Geisel 1993).

A 1992 survey by Towers

Perrin showed that 37 per cent have changed healthcare plan
provisions to require more out-of-pocket expenses from
future retirees and 28 per cent have already taken similar
action for current retirees (HR Focus 1992).

Other results

reported that while companies were in agreement that plan
changes would be needed 78 per cent had not decided how to
manage the transition obligation (Cameron 1992).
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Amir and Livnat (1994) examined early adopters to
determine if there was a delay in adopting SFAS 106 due to
attempt to renegotiate PRB costs.

They suggested that if

management was successful in renegotiations,

then future

cash outflows for PRB would be reduced and the negative
effects on the financial statements would be smaller.
There would be additional cost, however,
up to offset the renegotiation,

in benefits given

(e.g. Some firms in the

sample gave stock options to employees as compensation for
a reduction of postretirement benefits.)

The managers

would possibly be able to replace an obligation which must
be recognized with an off-balance sheet obligation.

They

confirmed their hypothesis in finding that 1992 adopters
had been more active in renegotiating plan benefits with
employees than 1991 adopters.
Amir and Ziv (1992) also examined renegotiation costs.
They hypothesized that firms waiting until the mandatory
adoption date were more likely to renegotiate than those
adopting early and that the PRB of renegotiating firms was
higher than those not attempting to renegotiate.

The

results confirmed that renegotiation of plan benefits in
order to reduce the size of the liability did occur more
frequently among the firms which delayed adoption than
among early adopters or disclosers.

They also found that
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firms delaying adoption had the largest PRB liability of
the three groups in the sample.
Hittelstaedt, Nichols and Reiger (1994) examined why a
firm chose to amend their PRB plan.

Their results

indicated that plan cuts were driven by increased
contracting costs as a result of adverse reporting
consequences of SFAS 106.

Also the presence of financial

weakness prior to adopting SFAS 106 and to a lesser extent,
health care cost increases of the firm were shown to be
part of the cause for plan cuts.
These studies indicate that the effects of adopting
SFAS 106 have a major influence on the decision to make
changes in PRB plans.

By choosing a one-time write-off

which maximizes the decrease in income, managers could,

in

effect, create a situation which allows them the
opportunity to make cuts in employee benefits while not
taking the full blame.

These plan amendments would reduce

future benefits to employees and leave more income to the
possible benefit of the managers.

To create the maximum

expense from the adoption, managers would choose the
immediate recognition method for the transition obiigation.
The following hypothesis is proposed.
H„: Firms which have amended their nonpension
postretirement benefit plan will use the
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immediate recognition method of adopting SFAS
106.
Research Model
Firm-specific characteristics for firms choosing
alternative methods of recognizing the OPEB transition
method in the adoption of SFAS 106 is evaluated using the
following model:
TRANS = b + b, (LEV) + b (BON) + b.(SIZE) +
b4(ADOPT) + b. (IND) + b. (RET) + b (109) +
b(AMEND) ■+ e.
w here:
Trans = a dichotomous variable where a 1
indicates that the firm used the
immediate recognition method to expense
the OPEB transition obligation, 0
indicates that the delayed recognition
method was selected.
Bonus plan hypothesis variable
BON = a dummy variable where a l indicates the
existence of an income-based bonus plan, a
0 indicates no such plan is in place.
Debt hypothesis variable
LEV = ratio of long-term debt to stockholder's
equ ity;
Political cost hypotheses variables
The variable SIZE is represented by two different
proxies tested in separate models:

Details of the types of plan amendments will be
collected for further descriptive study and analysis.
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ASSET = log of total assets in the year of adoption of
SFAS 106.
PLANSIZE = the amount of the transition
obligation/stockholders' equity of the
f irm.
The other political cost variables are represented as
follows:
ADOPT = a dummy variable where a 1 indicates early
adoption of SFAS 106, a 0 indicates timely
adoption.
IND = a dummy variable where a l indicates membership
in a regulated or politically sensitive
industry, 0 indicates otherwise.
Postretirement related variables
RET =
109 =

a

ratio of retirees to current employees

a dummy variable where 1 indicates the
concurrent adoption of SFAS 109, o indicates
otherwise.

PIan amendment variable
AMEND =

a
dummy variable where 1 indicates that a
postretirement benefit plan amendment has been
announced within a six month window of adoption
of SFAS 106, o indicates otherwise.

Variable Selection
The bonus plan hypothesis variable,
after analyzing previous research.

BON,

is adopted

Since the size of the

transition obligation is a material amount for most firms,
the effect on the boundaries should be similar for most
firms that have plans, thus the dummy variable is used
instead of a range of variables describing plan
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boundaries.1

Information concerning bonus plans is

derived from reviewing data bases (National Automated
Accounting Research System [NAARS], Disclosure)
statements where applicable.

and proxy

The expected sign on BON is

not predicted at this point.
The debt hypothesis variable, LEV, is selected after
reviewing those used in previous studies.
of a firm’s leverage.

LEV is a measure

Leverage has been shown to be a

proxy for a firm's closeness to violation of debt
covenants.

Duke and Hunt (1990) and Press and Weintrop

(1990) demonstrated this relationship in two respects.
They showed that leverage has a relationship to the
existence of accounting-based covenants and that leverage
is also related to closeness to default on some types of
covenants.
Accounting information to calculate the leverage ratio
is collected from COMPUSTAT.
negative.

The expected sign of LEV is

This is predicted because firms with high

leverage and possible covenant violation would be expected
to avoid immediate recognition of the transition obligation
expense.

1 The income/loss results of the transition method
choice will be examined as well with the possible inclusion
of another dummy variable to represent these effects.
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The potential existence of political costs is
represented by several variables.

The political cost

hypothesis indicates that the size of the firm is expected
to be significant to the accounting choice decision.
size variables are proposed: ASSET and PLANSIZE.

Two

ASSET is

measured using the log of total assets, as used by Watts
and Zimmerman (1986) and more recently by Amir and Livnat
(1992) .
The use of a measure of the size of the plan,
PLANSIZE,

itself,

is included to represent a different proxy for

the size of the firms which is specific to the proposed
research questions.

Sami and Welsh (1992)

included the

pension plan obligation (ABOSIZE) as a surrogate for firm
size.

They found that this variable was significant to the

decision to adopt SFAS 87 early.
1994)

Amir and Livnat

(1992,

found that the size of the OPEB liability was also

significant in the decision to adopt SFAS 106 early.
The amount of the transition obligation is divided by
the firm's stockholder's equity to give a more comparable
measure of the size of the plan in relation to other firms.
ASSET is acquired from COMPUSTAT data.

PLANSIZE is taken

from the annual report of the year of adoption from NAARS.
The expected sign of both proxies for firm size is
positive.
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ADOPT is a dichotomous variable indicating whether
SFAS 106 was adopted early.

Bell and Bible (1987)

and

Gujarathi and Hoskin (1992) found research results which
supported the relationships between adoption timing and
choice of transition method in earnings management.

The

adoption date is available in annual report information on
NAARS.

The expected sign is positive.

Membership in regulated or politically sensitive
industry is determined by SIC code and industries which
have been determined by previous research as regulated and
politically sensitive.

Bowen, Lacey, and Noreen (1981)

included the oil and gas industry.

Amir and Livnat

used utilities and financial institutions.

Khurana and

Loudder (1994) examined rate-regulated utilities.
(1991)

(1992)

Scott

further defined regulated as all firms with more

than 50% of their revenues from specified lines of
business:

telephone, electric and gas utilities,

interstate gas distributors,

and defense contractors.

All

of these are included along with transportation and the
food industry.

The expected sign is positive.

The variable RET was used by Espahbodi, Strock, and
Tehranian
force.

(1981) to measure the maturity of a firm's work

They suggested the ratio of retirees to current

employees, which is suggested here.
the information,

In order to acquire

they contacted personnel offices of the
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firms in their sample.

Amir (1993) used the ERISA-Blue

Book of Pension Funds to obtain the number of retirees and
the annual reports for the current number of employees.
The NAARS and CD Disclosure data bases and US Department of
Labor Forms 5500 are used to obtain this information in
addition manual collection where necessary.
Footnotes to the annual reports on NAARS and CD
Disclosure reveal when a firm adopted SFAS 109.

A dummy

variable is used to indicate if SFAS 109 was adopted in the
same year as SFAS 106.

The expected sign is positive.

Since the presence of a plan amendment occurring near
the adoption of SFAS 106 may indicate that managers of a
firm are manipulating the earnings to achieve a desired
result, namely the reduction of PRB costs, a dichotomous
variable is included.

Plan changes are found in footnotes

to the annual reports, proxy statements or in search of
press releases or other announcements.

The expected sign

is positive.
Sample Selection
A sample of public firms is taken from COMPUSTAT for
years 1989 to 1994.

The f irms are selected by retrieving

those with information corresponding to the desired
variables listed above.

The sample is reduced by further

retrieval of information on NAARS and CD DISCLOSURE data
bases.

A preliminary search of NAARS revealed 2731 firms
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showing adoption of SFAS 106 in their footnotes through
June 30, 1993.

(Although some of these may have been

duplicates in the data base, the sample size appeared to be
very large.):
Statistical Analysis
Logit analysis is used to test the relationship
between the dependent and independent variables in this
model.

Logit has been shown to have several advantages

over ordinary least squares regression

(OLS)

using a dichotomous dependent variable

(Stone and Rasp

1991, N e t e r , Wasserman, and Kutner 1989).

in a model

Using the

nonlinear cumulative logistic probability function,

logit

automatically produces probability estimates that fall
between zero and one.
One condition that must be considered in the use of
Logit is sample size.

Stone and Rasp (1991) found that

sample sizes of 200 or more are necessary to ensure that
the nominal and empirical error rates will not be
significantly different.

Aldrich and Nelson (1984)

suggested that 50 cases per parameter will ensure that
parameters will be unbiased in their estimates.

When bias

appears because of a small sample size, the t-tests will
Cursory examination of a sample of early adopters on
NEXIS, through 1992, indicated 76 firms would use
amortization and 216 would immediately recognize the
transition obligation.
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have an anticonservatively biased result.

Since SFAS 106

is required of all companies with postretirement plans,
acquiring a sample of significant magnitude should not be a
problem.

Preliminary examination of early adopters (as of

June 30, 1993) yielded a sample of 216 firms selecting
immediate recognition and 75 selecting delayed recognition.
Univariate tests are conducted on the variables. The
variables are tested using Chi-square analysis, as well as
correlation tests.

Transformations are examined where

indicated, possibly in the SIZE variables.

T-tests or

Wilcoxon tests are performed to examine interaction between
variables as some is expected, especially among the
political cost variables.

Potential relationships between

the workforce maturity variable and the plan amendments,
and between early adopters and industry variables are
analyzed.

Where necessary, the model is expanded and

observations are deleted as the exploratory results
indicate.
Expected Contributions
Previous research concerning SFAS 106 concentrates on
the characteristics and choices made by early adopters,
well as market reaction to early adoption.

as

This research

examines the effects of having a choice of transition
methods using firm characteristics of a sample of all
companies with postretirement benefits which have adopted
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the statement,

both early adopters and those which adopted

at the mandatory adoption date.

The model tests for

significance of the variables to indicate which firm
characteristics are important in the selection of
accounting methods.
Previous research on firm-specific variables has
yielded mixed results.

The attached tables display the

results of research on the bonus plan, debt, and size
hypotheses as well as research on postretirement benefits.
Four out of the eight bonus plan studies listed indicated
support for the hypothesis,

11 of the 14 debt hypothesis

studies indicated support, and all but three of the 12 size
hypothesis studies indicated that there is support for this
hypothesis.

The postretirement studies indicated support

for these hypothesis, but frequently revealed conflicting
or unexpected results and ambiguities,

depending upon the

nature of the study and the variables selected.

The

results of this research attempt to add clarification to
previously inconclusive research results on the standard
hypotheses of positive accounting theory using the
transition method choice of SFAS 106, and to extend and
confirm the research which has shown that managers do take
opportunities to manage the earnings and influence
investors with the adoption of a new standard.
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While results of the traditionally studied hypotheses
add to the body of information in existence, a new area is
contributed by testing data specific to the postretirement
related hypothesis.

Published research on SFAS 106, up to

this time, has concentrated primarily on studies of early
adopters and disclosers.

Tests of firm-specific variables

have been done to determine differences between firms
choosing to adopt early and those choosing to wait.
Researchers have found several significant variables,

but

the results have also shown some areas of conflicting
results

(See Table 3.4).

Other studies have examined the

market effects of SFAS 106 and related announcements on
firm share prices.

This research uses more recent data to

present new information, by selecting a sample from all
firms which have adopted SFAS 106 since its announcement
date.

Also by examining the relationships between maturity

of the workforce, the concurrent adoption of SFAS 109, use
of plan amendments, and the transition method selected, new
variables are introduced and new information is made
available, and relationships are tested which have not
previously been examined.

Future research concerning new

statements and their adoptions will be able to benefit from
th i s .
Accounting information is intended to communicate
information about the financial position of the firm.

The
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FASB, along with other regulatory bodies, promulgate
statements and guidelines to aid the communication process.
Accounting standards have,

in recent years, been used to

address social issues as well.

Both SFAS 87 and SFAS 106

appear to be part of the attempt to provide security for
employees (as well as other stakeholders of the firm) and
seem to fall into place with the trends experienced in the
political arena at this time.
This role of the FASB has been questioned.

Some

concerned individuals feel that the FASB is charged with
maintaining usability and representativeness of financial
statements and not public policy setting (Sweeney 1993).
In an attempt to make accounting numbers representative of
reality, as in the case of pension and postretirement
benefits, the FASB will potentially affect millions of
workers.

Thus, by addressing accounting issues they are

able to dictate social policy with great economic
consequences.
By providing method choices which allow managers to
adjust reported numbers to their own benefits, the FASB can
transfer the responsibility of these consequences to
manager.

Sunder(1988)

discussed the FASB's role as policy

setter and suggested that perhaps they should assume some
modesty with respect to their ability to devise new
accounting methods which create "socially preferred
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standards".

This research attempts to explore the area of

earnings management and the effect on new standards.

The

FASB should take into account the results of this and other
related research in decision making concerning the adoption
of new standards and the actual results achieved.

CHAPTER 4

Results
Results of this research provide interesting new
information concerning the three PRB related variables:
RETEMP,

109, and AMEND.

RETEMP and 109 were shown to be

significant to the transition method choice decision, while
AMEND was not significant,
expectations.

but had a sign opposite to

Confirmation was also obtained for the bonus

theory and some aspects of the political cost theory.
The first section of this chapter discusses the sample
selection; the second section provides descriptive
statistics of the variables used; logistic regression
results are reported in the third section; and the
predictive ability of the model is analyzed in the fourth
section. The results are summarized in the last section of
the chapter.

Tables and appendices are included or

referenced where appropriate.
Sample Selection
The logistic regression model used in this research
contained eight independent variables,

thus, a sample size

of 2 00 observations, providing over twenty observations per
variable,

was the desired goal. Criteria for inclusion in
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the study were:

1) existence of postretirement plans and

adoption of SFAS 106, and 2) availability of the required
financial and corporate data for each variable included in
the model.

Using these criteria, the initial sample was

collected in a two step process.
Selection of a sample, for which financial information
was readily available,

began with a list of publicly traded

companies drawn from Standard and Poor's Compustat
(COMPUSTAT) annual data base.

A total of 2,467 firms

listing a Standard Industrial Classification

(SIC) code and

reported amounts for stockholder's equity, total
liabilities, current liabilities and total assets was
selected.

From these firms, 733 firms were randomly

selected for review to determine their status of adoption
of SFAS 106.
The Lexis-Nexis (NAARS) data base was used to examine
the annual reports for fiscal years 1990-1994

(the most

current period available). ’ Of these, 211 indicated the
existence of a postretirement benefit plans and adoption of
SFAS 106 between the years 1990 and 1993.

Table 4.1

'The Exposure Draft on postretirement benefits was
issued in 1989.
SFAS 106 was issued in December 1990.
The
statement required, with few exceptions, that companies
adopt the provisions for fiscal years beginning after
December 1992.
However, as companies became aware of the
FASB's increased interest in this area,
some began
adopting the required provisions earlier than the
prescribed deadlines.
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presents the breakdown of the sample by adoption year.

One

firm adopted SFAS 106 in Fiscal Year (FY) 1990, sixteen in
FY 1991.

Seventy-eight adopted in FY 1992 and 101 adopted

in 1993.14
Table 4.1
Sample Breakdown By Adoption Year
Year

Number of Companies

1990
1991
1992
1993

1
16
78
101
Total

196

Searches of annual reports, proxy statements and press
releases on NAARS,

for these 211 firms yielded data for all

but one variable.

Information concerning the number of

retirees and employees for each firm in the sample was
obtained from a review of US Department of Labor Annual
Report forms 5500 compiled by Judy Diamond Associates,
Fifteen firms, lacking this d a t a , were eliminated.

Inc.

The

final sample size was 196 firms (See Appendix A).

'4Of this 101, five indicated that this was an early
adoption.
Their determination was used to include them in
the early adoption group for the variable EARLY, thus
yielding the breakdown of 100 early and 96 timely adopters.
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Descriptive Statistics

This section contains a general description of the
overall characteristics of the sample firms.

The following

section will discuss the characteristics of the firms in
greater detail,

broken down by dependent and independent

variables, with results of univariate analysis.

Table 4.2

displays the mean and range for the continuous variables
collected for each firm, which is used for ratio
calculation.

Table 4.3 gives the mean and range for the

actual ratios calculated for the continuous variables and
the frequencies of occurrence for the indicator variables.
Several financial variables were used in this research
to calculate the two size proxies;

transition obligation,

stockholder’s equity, and total assets. The mean amount of
the transition obligation recognized in adopting SFAS 106,
for the firms in this sample, was $479.02 million.

The

range for the entire sample was from $.34 to $13,940
million.

Since the largest transition obligation caused by

adoption of SFAS 106, reported by General Motors, was $25
billion,

the observations in this sample appear to cover a

good portion of the population spectrum.
The mean amount of stockholder's equity was $1,746.72
million.

The range of stockholder's equity was from

-$232.72 million to $21,683.00 million.

The range of

Fortune 500 companies for 1993 (the most often selected
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adoption year) was from -$2080.9 to 34,792.0 million
(Teitelbaum 1994).

(The Fortune 500 is selected from a

population of publicly traded firms and represents the
highest ranked companies by Fortune magazine.)

Eight of

the sample firms had negative stockholder's equity, out of
196 observations (4.1%).

(Twenty-two of the Fortune 500

firms had negative stockholder's equity values (4.4%).)
Table 4.4 presents a list of these eight firms along with
the amount of net income for the year of adoption,
transition obligation, and transition method choice.

Of

these eight, all had negative income for the year of
adoption.

All firms, except Ceridian Corp. and National-

Standard had negative stockholder's equity greater than the
amount of the year's net loss,

indicating a negative

balance from the previous year.

All but two firms, Raytech

Corp. and United Merchants and Mfrs (UM&M), had net losses
surpassing the amount of the transition obligations, which
meant that these firms had net losses before including the
write off of the transition obligation.

Raytech and UM&M

would have had a positive net income if they had not chosen
to recognize the entire transition obligation.

However,

Raytech and UM&M had negative stockholder's equity prior to
adoption of SFAS 196, indicating that they were already in
questionable financial standing.

With only one of the

negative SE firms, Genrad, choosing the amortization
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Table 4.2
Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Variable

(Std.Dev)

Range

TRANSOB
($ MILLIONS)

TS :* 479.03 (1527.48)
610.30 (153 .06)
IR
166.68 (34.91)
DR

SE

TS
IR
DR

1746.72
1849.59
1502.12

(3105.52)
(282.81)
(331.64)

TOTASS
($ MILLIONS)

TS
IR
DR

7906.81
7225.27
9528.42

(20280.00)
(1499.58)
(3366.42)

LTLIAB
($ MILLIONS)

TS
IR
DR

1636.42
1761.44
1338.97

(00.50)
(3815.49)
(2697.24)

RETIREES
(PERSONS)

TS
IR
DR

3925.76 (11030.00)
4895.96 (12865.89)
1617.33 (3262.46)

0.00- 90832.00
0.00- 90832.00
0.00- 16028.00

EMPLOYEES
(PERSONS)

19626.00 (37130.00)
TS
IR, 24892.47 (42741.74)
7094.17 (10031.66)
DR

8.00-2603 59.00
8.00-260359.00
196.00- 59599.00

($ MILLIONS)

TS= Total Sample (196 firms),
IR= Immediate Recog (138 firms),
DR= Delayed Recog (58 firms)

0.34-13940.00
0.43-13940.00
0.34- 1079.00
-232.72-21683.00
-232.72-21683.00
-45.29-17144.00
20.44-186933.00
20.44-168259.00
40.60-186933.00
0.00-24577.00
0.49-24577.00
0.00-14115.00
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Table 4.3
Descriptive Statistics
Continuous Variables
Variable

Mean (Std. Dev)

Range

LEV
Long-term liab/
Stkhldr Equity

TS:
IR:
DR:

1.12*' (3.18)
1.13 (1.79)
1. 10 (3.61)

-9.71-36.47
-9.71-36.47
-1.68-12.80

PLANSIZE
Transition oblig/
Stkhldr Equity

TS:
IR:
DR:

.83 (4.42)
.60 (3.37)
1.38 (6.39)

-1.96-38.48
-1.96-35.19
-0.27-38.48

ASSET
log of Total Assets

TS:
IR:
DR:

7 .50 (1.82)
7.40 (1.84)
7 .74 (1.77)

3.02-12.14
3.02-12.03
3.86-12.14

RETEMP
Retirees/
Employees

TS:
IR:
DR:

.31
(0.98)
.32
(1.08)
.31 (0.68)

0.00-12.53
0.00-12.53
0.00- 4.88

Indicator variables
Deoendent Variable
TMETH
(adoption method choice)
Independent Variables
SIC
(industry code)

Frequency
58/138

140/56

(0/1)
0=delayed recog. (DR)
l=immed. recog. (IR)
0=unregulated
l=regulated

ADOPT
(early adoption)

96/100

0=timely adoption
l=early adoption

109
(concurrent with 106)

56/140

0=not concurrent
l=concurrent adoption

AMEND
141/55
(announced plan amendments)
BONUS
(firm has bonus plan)

11/185

0= no amendments
1= amendments
0=no bonus plan
l=bonus plan

TS= Total Sample (196 firms),
DR= Delayed Recog
firms),
IR= Immediate Recog (138 firms),

(58
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Table 4.4
Firms With Negative Stockholders'
($ Millions)
Name

SE

Net
Inc.

Equity

Trans.
Oblig.

Trans.
Meth.
1= IR, 0=DR

-10.29

-4 .92

2 .25

1

-100.00

-392.00

55.80

1

Everest and Jennings -30.80

-18.91

.49

1

Interlake Corp

-232.72

-2 7.07

14 .04

1

-24.83

-53.38

48 .68

1

-5.86

-4 .75

5. 97

1

United Merchants
and Mfrs.

-34 .14

-0.75

15.30

1

Genrad Inc.

-45.29

-43.80

12 .09

0

Arc International
Ceridian Corp

National-Standard
Raytech Corp

method,

this table

gives appearance of a tendency toward

the "big bath" theory for firms with negative stockholder's
equity.
The mean amount of total assets was $7,906.81 million
with a range from $20.44 million to $186,93.00 million.
(The range for the Fortune 500 was $143.9 million to
$251,506 million,

the median value was $1,512 million.

range of this sample was lower,

The

indicating the possibility

that some smaller firms were selected.)

Firm debt was

represented by long-term debt, with a mean value of
$1,636.42 million with a range from $0.00 to
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$24,566.00 million.

The mean number of retirees for the

sample was 3,925.76 with a range from 0.00 to 90,832.00.
The mean number of employees was 19,626.00 with a range
from 8.00 to 260,359.00.
Sample firms came from 122 industry classifications
(See Appendix A ) . The sample was divided into two industry
groups,

regulated and non-regulated.

Regulated companies

were defined as those in banking/financial, communications,
transportation,

and utilities industries.

These were

identified by SIC codes beginning with either four or six.
The most freguently represented SIC codes are shown in
Table 4.5.

Firms classified as regulated totaled 56 with

140 classified as unregulated.

This indicates an almost 3

to 1 ratio of unregulated to regulated firms in the sample,
however, among the regulated firms, there was more
concentration within a SIC code, with 6712 and 4931 the
most represented.
One hundred of the sample firms adopted SFAS 106
early, as evidenced by the adoption date or indicated in
the footnotes.
adopters.

Ninety-six were categorized as timely

SFAS 109 was adopted in the same year by the

remaining 56.

Postretirement benefit plan amendments were

announced by 55 sample firms, while 141 did not announce
amendments within the specified window of time.

Only 11 of
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the sample firms did not indicate the existence of a bonus
plan, with 185 firms having a plan.

Table 4.5
Top Ten Industry Classifications
SIC

Frequency
14
12
9
8
6
5
4
3
3
3

6712
4931
4911
2911
4813
2711
3714
4923
4941
2834

There are roughly three to one ratios for three of the
descriptive characteristics examined.

Industry

(Unregulated/regulated), concurrent 109 adoption
(concurrent/non-concurrent) and amendments (no
amendments/announced amendments).
adoption is almost evenly split,

The issue of early

100 early and 96 timely,

the only characteristic indicating an extremely lopsided
division is the existence of a bonus plan (11 no plan/185
with p l a n ) .
Univariate Analysis
Th e d e p e n d e n t

variable

Firms were divided into two groups based on the method
used to recognize the transition obligation (TMETH).

Of
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the 196 sample firms,

138

(70.4 percent)

chose to recognize

the entire transition obligation in the year of adoption as
a cumulative effect of an accounting change.

These firms

are referred to as the immediate recognition (IR)

firms.

Fifty-eight firms (29.6 percent) chose to amortize the
obligation over a future period and disclosed the entire
obligation only in the footnotes.
the delayed recognition (DR) firms.

These are referred to as
Tables 4.2 and 4.3

display the mean and range of financial variables as well
as the frequencies of indicator variables for IR and DR
groups.

These are discussed in detail in the following

section.
The independent variables
In order to examine how the choice of transition
method is affected by firm specific variables and to answer
the primary research question as to the relationship
between plan amendments and transition method choice, nine
independent variables were analyzed to test the eight
hypotheses presented in Chapter Three,

(Two variables were

used to test the size hypothesis; PLANSIZE,

transition

obligation/stockholder's equity - a scaled measurement of
the size of a firm's plan and ASSET, a log of total assets,
Use of two different size variables is designed to test the
differing effects of using absolute size

(assets of the

company) versus a relative measure of a firm's
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postretirement benefit plan, a variable pertinent to the
research question.

A firm's size ranking may differ in

relation to the other sample firms depending on the size
measure used.)
Univariate analysis was conducted by performing ttests on each continuous variable (LEV, PLANSIZE, ASSET,
and RETEMP)

to determine if the means of the two

independent groups, based on the choice of transition
obligation method (IR and DR), were significantly
different.

If results indicated that the null hypothesis

- that the means were the same - could be rejected,

the

variable was assumed to have a significant influence on the
transition method choice.

Similarly, Chi Square analysis

was conducted on the binomial variables (SIC, BONUS, ADOPT,
109, and AMEND)

to determine the association of these firm

characteristics with transition method choice.

This test

uses the null hypothesis that there is no association
between the test variable and the dependent variable.
Results of the Chi Square test measure the strength of the
evidence that an association exists, but do not indicate
the strength of the association (SAS Institute Inc.

1994).

T-test results for the continuous variables (LEV, PLANSIZE,

Unless otherwise indicated all statistical tests
were performed on the SAS System, which test the hypothesis
that the means of two independent groups are equal.
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ASSET, and RETEMP)

are reported in Table 4.6.

The results

of Chi Square analysis for the binomial variables
BONUS, ADOPT,

(SIC,

109, and AMEND) are displayed in Table 4-7.

The following sub-sections detail analysis of each variable
with a summary discussion at the conclusion.
Table 4.6
Test of Equal Means (Continuous Variables)
Variable
LEV
PLANSIZE

DF

t-stat

p-value

188 .7

-.0734'

.9415

70.4

.8867'

.3782

ASSET

194 .0

1.2190

.2243

RETEMP

165. 2

-.0783*

.9377

indicates use of t-test for unequal variances
Leverage
Hypothesis Four was developed to test whether

high

leverage is related to the choice of delayed recognition of
the transition obligation.

A ratio of a firm's non-current

liabilities to stockholder's equity (LEV) was used to
represent the debt position of the sample firms (See Table
4.3).

The mean for the total sample of 196 firms was 1.25.

The mean for the IR firms was 1.13 and for the DR firms was
1.11.

The range was from a minimum of -9.7 1 to 36.472.
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As previously discussed, eight of the sample firms had
negative stockholder's equity causing negative LEV values
(See Table 4.4).

Firms facing financial distress

(as

exemplified by negative SE values might be expected to have

Table 4.7
Frequency Analysis (Indicator Variables)
Variable

Chi-square (DF=1)
65.862

SIC

p-value
.000‘

BONUS

6 .483

.011*

ADOPT

50.014

.000'
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AMEND

1.410

.235

.628

.428

significant at alpha < .05

debt problems as well.

Four of the eight distressed firms

have LEV values greater than one standard deviation from
the mean.

(Univariate tests were conducted both with these

eight firms included and excluded.

Their exclusion yielded

results similar to those obtained using the entire sample,
so only the testing of the entire sample is discussed.)
To test for a significant difference between the means
of the two groups a t-test was conducted.

To determine

whether an exact or approximate t-test should be used, an
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F-test was first conducted.

The F-test for equal variances

resulted in a p=value of .0000, which indicated that the
null hypothesis of equal variances should be rejected and
an approximate t-test assuming unequal variances was used.
The approximate t-test yielded a statistic of -.0734

with

a p-value of .9415 which denoted that the means could not
be assumed to be different between the two groups.
Table 4.7.)

Based on the univariate analysis,

(See

there does

not appear to be any significant differences between firms
choosing immediate or delayed recognition of the transition
method based on debt structure.

This result does not

support the traditional debt hypothesis, as had been
expected.
Firm Bis*
According to positive accounting theory,
one representative of political cost.

firm size is

The larger a firm,

the more visibility it may have and the more attention may
be received from political bodies.

To test Hypothesis

Three, the effect of firm size (representing political
cost) on the transition method choice,
size were used.

two measures of firm

Each of these variables characterized one

aspect of the relative size of the firm.

The first was a

ratio (PLANSIZE) of the amount of the transition obligation
(TRANSOB) to total stockholder's equity (SE).
4.3.)

(See Table

The mean transition obligation for the total sample
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was $479.03 million (See Table 4.2) with a range from $.34
million to a maximum of $13,940 million.

The mean for the

IR group was $610.3 million and for the DR group was $166.7
million.

The mean of the ratio PLANSIZE for the entire

sample was .832 (See Table 4.3) with a range of -1.96 to
38.48.

(The existence of negative values for stockholder's

equity of eight firms caused negative values of PLANSIZE.
(See Table 4.4)

PLANSIZE for all of the eight firms fell

within one standard deviation of the sample mean.)

The

mean for the IR group was .602 and 1.380 for the DR group.
An approximate t-test was conducted to test the
hypothesis that the means of the two independent groups was
the same.

(An F-test for equal variances for PLANSIZE

yielded a p-value of .0000,

indicating that variances were

unequal and thus an approximate t-test assuming unequal
variances was conducted.)

The t-test yielded a statistic

of .8867 and gave a p-value of ,3782 (See Table 4-6), which
indicated that the null hypothesis,

the means of the two

groups are equal, could not be rejected.

There does not

appear to be a significant difference between firms
choosing immediate and delayed recognition methods based on
size of the plan relative to the firm's equity.
result does not confirm the political cost

(size)

hypothesis unlike previous research studies.

This
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The second variable used to represent firm size,
(ASSET), was the log of a firm's total assets

(TOTASS).

The mean of the total assets (TOTASS) of all firms in the
sample was $7,906.8 million (See Table 4.2), with a range
from $20.4 to $186,933 million.

The mean of the log,

ASSET, was 7.50 with a range from 3.03 to 12.14.

The mean

for the IR group was 7.74 and the mean for the DR group was
7.40

(See Table 4.3).
The F-test for ASSET resulted in a p-value of .7768,

indicating that the null hypothesis of equal variances
could not be rejected, thus an exact t-test assuming equal
variance was used to test if the means of the two groups
were equal.

This t-test gave a t-statistic of 1.2190 and a

p-value of .2243.

The null hypothesis that the means were

egual was not rejected.
The results of this t-test did not appear to confirm
the hypothesis that firm size is related to choice of the
immediate recognition method.

Neither PLANSIZE nor ASSET

was significant to the choice of transition method.

This

result indicates that firm size, whether measured by the
relative size of the postretirement benefit plan or the
total assets of the firm, had no influence on management's
decision as to the transition method used.
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F i n Maturity
The relationship of the maturity of the workforce of a
firm to the choice of transition method is the subject of
Hypothesis Six.

A ratio of the number of retirees to

number of employees was used to measure workforce maturity
for each sample firm (RETEMP).

The mean ratio was

.315

(see Table 4.3), which signified that there were more
employees than retirees.
.318.

For the IR firms this ratio was

The mean for the DR group was .308. which seemed to

indicate a close match between levels for each group.

The

range for the sample was from a ratio of 0 to a maximum of
12.534.
Since an F-test for equal variances gave a p-value of
.0001,

indicating that the null hypothesis of equal

variances could be rejected, an approximate t-test was used
to test whether the means of the two independent groups
were equal.

The t-test yielded a t-statistic of -.0783

with a p-value of .9377 (see Table 4.4) which suggested
that the means of the two groups are not significantly
different.

Thus, Hypothesis Six was not confirmed and the

assumption that maturity was significant to the transition
method choice is not supported.

This result indicates that

even though Espahbodi, Strock and Tehranian (1991)

showed

that RETEMP was significant to investors in relation to
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SFAS 106, this ratio was not significant to managers in the
adoption decision.
Industry Classification
Fifty-six firms (28.6 percent) were in the regulated
category and 140 (71.4 percent) were non-regulated.
Sixteen (11.6 percent) of the IR firms were in regulated
industries while 122 (88.4 percent) were not.

Forty firms

(69 percent) of the DR group were regulated and 18 (31
percent) were members of non-regulated industries.

A chi-

square test yielded a Pearson chi-square statistic of
65.862 with a p-value of .000 (see Table 4.4)

indicating

that there was an association between regulation of
industries and transition method choice.
Since there were two predominant industries in the
regulated group, banking/financial

(SIC=between 6000 and

6999) and utilities/transportation (SIC=between 4000 and
4999).

Chi-square tests were performed with each SIC group

representing the regulated variable alone.

When the

banking group was excluded from the regulated subdivision,
the chi-square statistic was 49.393 with a p-value of .000.
When the 6000 level SIC firms were used as the regulated
firms, with utilities excluded, the chi-square statistic
was 9.451 with a p-value of .002.

Both industry groupings

appear to be significant to the transition method choice
decision,

individually and combined, consistent with the
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expectations of Hypothesis Six.

Thus, univariate analysis

suggests that membership in a regulated industry plays a
role in the adoption decision.

This result supports

previous research showing that regulated industries want to
delay recognition

(Kelly 1983;

Bowen, Lacey and Noreen

1981; Mittelstaedt, Nichols and Reiger 1994).
Bonus Plsns
Eleven (5.6 percent) of the 196 sample firms did not
report any information indicating the existence of
incentive based bonus plans (BONUS).

One hundred eighty-

five (94.4 percent) did report the existence of a bonus
plan.

Of the firms that had plans 134 (97.1 percent)

the IR groups had plans as did 51 (87.9 percent)
group (see Table 4.2).

of

of the DR

A chi-square test1' resulted in a

Pearson chi-square statistic of 6.483 with a p-value of
.011 (see Table 4-7) which indicated that there was an
association between the existence of a bonus plan and
transition method choice.

The results of this test

(which

may be problematic, as a result of the low number of firms
without bonus plans)

indicate that Hypothesis One is

supported, with firms having plans tending to recognize
immediately.

These univariate results are compared to

u There were only four observations for firms
choosing immediate recognition with no bonus plan.
Due to
a count of less than five, the Chi-Square test, may not
yield completely valid results.
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multivariate analysis in order to draw final conclusions
concerning the significance of the bonus plan to the
adoption decision.
Early Adoption
Analysis of the choice to adopt SFAS 106 (ADOPT) prior
to the required adoption date revealed that of the 196
sample firms,

100 (51 percent) adopted SFAS 106 early,

while 96 (49 percent) chose to wait until the required
time.

Of the IR firms, 93 (67.4 percent)

45 (32.6 percent) adopted timely.

Seven

adopted early and
(12 percent)

of

the DR firms adopted early and 51 (88 percent) adopted
timely (see Table 4-3).

A chi-square analysis indicated a

Pearson chi-square statistic of 50.014 and a p-value of
.000 (see Table 4-7), which indicated that there was a
significant association between early adoption and
transition method choice, supporting Hypothesis Four that
early adopting firms choose to recognize the transition
obligation immediately.

This result seems to indicate that

firms wish to write off the transition obligation and to do
it early while those that plan to amortize choose to delay
as long as possible.
Concurrent Adoption of SFAS 109
One hundred forty firms (71.4 percent) of the sample
firms adopted SFAS 109 in the same accounting period as
SFAS 106, fifty-six (28.6 percent) did not.

Of the IR
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firms,

102 (73.9 percent) adopted concurrently and 36 (26.1

percent) did not.

Thirty-eight

firms adopted at the same time,
not (see Table 4-3).

(65.5 percent) of the DR
while 20 (34.5 percent)

did

A chi-square analysis yielded a

Pearson chi-square statistic of

1.410 with a p-value of

.235 (see Table 4-4), which indicated

that the null

hypothesis of no association between the concurrent
adoption and transition method choice could not be
rejected.

This did not appear to support Hypothesis Seven,

that firms adopting SFAS 109 at the same time as SFAS 106
will take the benefit of the tax-asset and recognize the
transition obligation immediately.
Plan Amendments
Press releases, annual reports, and proxy statements
were examined for years 1990 to 1994.

This was to allow at

least a two-year window around a firm's adoption of SFAS
106.

Postretirement plan amendments (AMEND) were announced

within this time frame by 55 (28.1 percent) of the sample
firms.

(Types of amendments announced are listed in

Appendix B.)

One hundred forty-one firms (71.9 percent)

did not report any plan amendments.
group,

Of those in the IR

41 (29.7 percent) reported amendments and 97 (70.3

percent) did not report any amendments.

Of the DR group,

14 (24.1 percent) reported amendments and 44
did not report amendments (see Table 4-2).

(75.9 percent)
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A chi-square analysis resulted in a Pearson chi-square
statistic of .628 with a p-value of .428 (see Table 4-4)
which indicated that the null hypothesis of no association
between plan amendments and transition method choice could
not be rejected.

This appears to discredit the assumptions

that managers would use the opportunity provided by
adoption of SFAS 106 to cut plan benefits and costs, while
absorbing the transition obligation.

Hypothesis Eight is

not supported by these results.
Discussion
Table 4.8 provides the results of hypothesis testing
using univariate analysis.

Results of the t-tests of

differences in means of variables

and the chi-square tests

of association indicated that three of the nine variables
had statistically significant relationships:
ADOPT.

BONUS, Sic,

Univariate analysis failed to reject the null

hypothesis of no significant relationship for LEV,
AMEND, PLANSIZE, SIZE and RETEMP.

109,

These results indicated

that there may be support for hypotheses one (bonus), four
(early adoption), and five (industry).

(See Table 4-8.)

This initial analysis provided support for the
traditional political cost hypotheses (with early adoption
and industry representing high political cost situations),
(Hypotheses four, and five), but failed to support the debt
hypothesis (Hypothesis two) and the political cost

116
hypothesis, as proxied by size (Hypothesis three).
Hypothesis one, the existence of a bonus plan, appears to
be supported,

but some problems may underlie the chi-square

analysis.
Results of univariate analysis did not support any of
the three hypotheses that were specific to the adoption of
SFAS 106 (Hypotheses Six - regarding work force maturity,
Seven - concurrent SFAS 109 adoption,
announced plan amendments).

and Eight -

Thus the conclusions drawn at

this point indicate that the presence of more retirees than
current employees is not important to the transition method
choice decision,

neither is the adoption of SFAS 109 nor

anticipated plan amendments.

The univariate test results

indicated that the answer to the primary research question
"Is there a significant relationship between plan
amendments and the transition method choice?" is no.
Logistic Regression Models
Two logistic regression models were used to evaluate
the relationship between the independent and dependent
variables.

The difference between the two models was the

different size proxies.

One model was tested using

PLANSIZE, a ratio of the transition
obiigation/stockholder's equity, and the other used ASSET,
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Table 4.8
Results of Univariate Analysis
Hypothesis

Prediction
The existence of an incomebased bonus-plan is related
to transition method choice.

Significant *

High leverage is related to
choice of the delayed
recognition method.

Not signif.

Large firm or plan size is
related to the choice of
the immediate recognition
method.

8

Results

Not signif.

Early adoption is related to
the choice of the immediate
recognition method.

Signif icant

Regulation of industry is
related to the choice of the
immediate recognition method.

Significant

Maturity of a firm's work
force is related to the
transition method choice.

Not signif.

Concurrent adoption 109 is
related to the choice of
the immediate recognition
method

Not signif.

Adoption of post-retirement
benefit plan amendments is
related to the choice of the
immediate recognition method.

Not signif.

*Less than five observations in on grouping may yield
questionable statistical results.
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the log of total assets.

(Each of these measures of

relative size of the firm captured a different aspect of
political cost. One gave the size as it relates to
postretirement benefits and the other gave a more
traditional measure of firm size.

In research in the

specific area of postretirement benefits, use of both
variables in the analysis may have yielded a more complete
picture.)
After these models were tested, the data was analyzed
for potential influential observations.
outliers were identified.

Eleven potential

These outliers were then

analyzed and the models were retested.

The following

sections present the results of the models, the
accompanying diagnostic evaluations and outlier analysis.
Results of logistic regression models
Two logistic regression models were first used to
assess the relationship between the choice of disclosure
method for the transition obligation and the independent
variables.

Each model contained eight independent

variables.

The first model contained the variable PLANSIZE

(transition obligation/stockholder's equity) as the size
proxy and the second contained ASSET (log of total assets)
as the size proxy.
Tables 4.9 and 4.10.

The regression results are shown in
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PLANSIZE Modal
The chi-square test for overall significance of this
model yielded a value of 100.158 (p=.0001),
the model fit was statistically significant.
value was .5656,

indicating that
The pseudo R

indicating the model has a moderate

predictive ability.

Three variables were identified as

significant at the .05 level:

ADOPT,

109, and SIC.

Three

variables had parameters with signs that were opposite to
the preliminary expectations.

PLANSIZE, AMEND and SIC were

each expected to have positive signs.

However,

of these

three, only SIC was significant.
These results indicated that there was a significant
relationship between the transition method choice and firms
adopting SFAS 106 early, those concurrently adopting SFAS
109 and membership in regulated and non-regulated
industries.

Hypothesis Four was confirmed as the variable

ADOPT was significant and in the expected direction,
showing a direct association between the decision to adopt
SFAS 106 early and the choice of immediately recognizing
the transition obligation.

Hypothesis Seven was also

confirmed indicating that firms that chose to adopt SFAS
109 in the same year as SFAS 106 also used the immediate
recognition method.
Hypothesis Five was not confirmed as the firms in
regulated industries did not choose the immediate
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Table 4.9
Logistic Regression Results
TRANSE Model
Variable

Predicted
sign

BONUS

undef ined

Parameter
estimate
l .1093

Chi-square
(p-value)
1.3460
(.2460)

LEV

-

-0.0386

PLANSIZE

+

-0.0449

ADOPT

+

2 .4882

22.0270
(.0001)*

SIC

+

-2.6161

32.0714
(.0001)*

-0.2229

1.5457
(.2138)

RETEMP

undefined

109

+

1.1457

AMEND

+

-0.1897

.3547
(.5515)
.7946
(.3727)

5.2888
(.0215)*
.1443
( .7040)

* Significant at alpha<.05
-2 LOG L (Chi-Square = 100.158, p-value =.0001, DF=8)
Pseudo-R

= .56898
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Table 4.10
Logistic Regression Results
ASSET Model
Variable

BONUS

Predicted
sign
undefined

Parameter
estimate

Chi-square
(p-value)

0.8886

0.7924
( .3734)

-0.0446

0. 5270
( .4679)

LEV

-

ASSET

+

0. 1720

1.7637
(.1842)

ADOPT

+

2.5312

22.2626
(.0001)*

SIC

+

-2.8996

29.6537
(.0001)*

-0.2513

1. 7747
(.1828)

RETEMP

undefined

109

+

1.2721

AMEND

+

-0.2383

Significant at alphac.05
-2 LOG L (Chi-Square = 101.159, p = .0001, DF = 8)
Pseudo R

= .57332

6.2202
(.0126)*
0.2221
(.6374)
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recognition method as predicted.

The variable SIC was

significant, but analysis revealed that firms in regulated
industries tended to use the amortization method, while
those in non-regulated industry were more likely to choose
immediate recognition.

In retrospect, this result is not

surprising, since many regulatory bodies have indicated a
willingness to allow various cost reducing measures and
regulated industries may be planning to take advantage of
these instead of taking a large loss immediately.
Analysis of this model confirmed one of the
postretirement benefit-specific hypotheses {concurrent 109
adoption)

and two political cost hypotheses (early adoption

and industry).

The other hypotheses of interest in the PRB

issue (firm maturity and amendments) were not confirmed in
this model, nor were the traditional bonus, debt or size
hypotheses.
ASSET Model
The size variable, PLANSIZE, used in the last model
was replaced with ASSET, the log of total assets.

This

model also was shown to have a significant fit, with a chisquare of 101.159

(p=.0001).

The logistic regression

resulted in the three variables, ADOPT,
statistically significant parameters.
results as in the previous model.

109 and SIC showing
These were the same
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All signs were the same except the parameter sign for
ASSET, the size proxy.
which,

In this model the sign was positive

if significant, would indicate a positive

relationship between the amount of a firm's assets and the
choice of the immediate recognition method.

However, ASSET

did not have significant results in the logistic
regression.

Since neither of the proxies for size were

significant in the regressions, this change of sign
presented an interesting, but not significant issue.
In this model, as in the previous one, only Hypotheses
Four and Seven were supported.

Early adoption and

concurrent adoption of SFAS 109 were significant to the
choice of transition method.

The industry variable was

significant, which meant that a firm's status as regulated
or non-regulated was important to the transition method
choice decision, but not in the expected direction.
Table 4.11 displays the results of the multivariate
analysis using the two models, with PLANSIZE and ASSET.
Both models yielded similar results.
and Seven were confirmed.

Hypotheses Four,

The industry regulation variable

was significant, but as the sign was opposite from the

A model testing both variables simultaneously
provided results similar to models using each individually.
The same three variables (ADOPT, 109, and SIC) were
significant and signs were the same on all variables.
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predicted sign, therefore Hypothesis Five was not
confirmed.
One of the PRB hypotheses introduced in this research
project,

Hypothesis Seven, testing whether concurrent

adoption of SFAS 109, was influential in the transition
method choice.

The others, testing whether firm maturity

and plan amendments were related to transition
Method choice, were not found to be significant in the
multivariate regression models.

The absence of firm

maturity as a significant variable,

is interesting in light

of the findings of Espahbodi, Strock and Tehranian

(1991)

which indicated that the ratio of retirees to employees was
significant to investors in relation to postretirement
benefits.

The findings relating to plan amendments show

that there is no verification (through 1994) to the fears
that managers would use the adoption of SFAS 106 to justify
plan amendments.

This finding provides new information to

the research on SFAS 106 since the question had not been
previously tested.

The traditional bonus, debt and size

hypotheses were also not found to be significant in these
mode1s .
Comparison of Univariata and Multivariate Results
Results of hypothesis testing using both univariate
and multivariate analysis are presented in Table 4.12.
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Table 4.11
Results of Multivariate Analysis
Hypothesis

Prediction

Results

The existence of an incomebased bonus-plan is related
to transition method choice.

Not confirmed

High leverage is related to
choice of the delayed
recognition method.

Not confirmed

Large firm size is related to
the choice of the immediate
recognition method.

Not confirmed

Early adoption is related to
the choice of the immediate
recognition method.

Confirmed

Regulation of industry is
related to the choice of the
immediate recognition method,

Not Confirmed
(Signif icant,
sign is wrong
direction)

Maturity of a firm's work
force is related to the
transition method choice.

Not confirmed

Concurrent adoption 109 is
related to the choice of
the immediate recognition
method

Conf irmed

Adoption of post-retirement
benefit plan amendments is
related to the choice of the
immediate recognition method.

Not confirmed
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The significance of the bonus plan variable was shown in
univariate testing (with questionable Chi-square results),
but the Hypothesis One was not confirmed in the logistic
regression.

Since the univariate tests were not as

reliable as the multivariate regression,

the conclusion

about the bonus plan variable is made based on the
regression results.

These indicated that the bonus theory,

which was upheld by previous researchers (Healy 1985,

Scot

1991) did not hold true in this research, possibly as a
result of the income decreasing combined with "big bath"
effects.
The relationship between early adoption of SFAS 106
and choice of the immediate recognition method was
significant in both tests and Hypothesis Four was
confirmed.

Early adoption had previously been tested by

many researchers including Amir and Livnat 1992; Gujarathi
and Hoskin 1992; Leauby, Ugras and Welch 1993b; and Amir
and Ziv 1994.

The results of this research confirm what

had been previously reported.

This is not surprising as

the political cost theory predicts such results.
The industry membership was significant in both tests,
but the direction, as shown in the logistic regression was
opposite to expectations,
confirmed.

so Hypothesis Five was not

However, this research clearly showed that the

regulatory status of a firm plays an important role in

Table 4.12
Results of Hypothesis Testing
l!ypot h e s 1 g

P r e d i c t ion

l-tesults

Unvarinte
1

J

1

7

M u l t i variate

".'he e x i s t e n c e of an i n c o m e Leased b o n u s - p l a n is r e l a t e d
to t r a n s i t i o n m e t h o d choice.

Confirmed

hot

confirmed

H i g h l e v e r a g e is r e l a t e d
c h o i c e of the d el a y e d
i ecu;] n 11 1 on method .

Hot c o n f i r m e d

Hot

conf irmed

.'urge firm si^e is r e l a t e d to
t he c h o i c e of the i m m e d i a t e
r e c o g n i t i o n method.

Not c o n f 1rmed

Not c on f i r m e d

burly a d n p L i o n is r e l a t e d to
the c h o i c e of the i m m e d i a t e
recoijn i t i on me thod ,

confirmed

C o n f ir me d

P o p u l a t i o n of i n d u s t r y is
r e l a t e d to the c h o i c e of the
i m m e d i a t e r e c o g n i t i o n method.

Hot c o n f l r m e d
(Signif i c a n t ,
not as pre d i c t e d )

Not Conf i rmed
(Significant, but
sig n in o p po s i t e direction)

M a t u r i t y of a firm's w o r k
force is r e l at e d to the
t r a n s i t i o n m et h o d c hoice.

Not c o n f i r m e d

Not c on f i r m e d

C o n c u r r e n t a d o p t i o n 109 is
r e l a t e d to the c h o i c e of
the 1mme d iate r o c o g n it ion
met hod

Not c o n f i r m e d

Confi r m e d

A d o p t i o n of post - r e t 1r e m e n t
belief it p l a n a m e n d m e n t s is
r e l a t e d tn the c h o i c e of the
im m e d i a t e r e c o g n i t i o n m e t h o d .

Hot c o n f i r m e d

Hot confi r m e d

to

Not confi r m e d
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transition method choice in the issue of postretirement
benefit plans, which is another support for the political
cost theory.

Other traditional variables; leverage, size

{both plan and firm), were not significant in either
analysis.

This indicates that the traditional debt and

size hypotheses were not relevant to the transition method
choice.
Concurrent adoption of SFAS 109 was not shown to be
significant in Chi-Square testing, but was a significant
variable in the logistic regression.

Thus, Hypothesis

Seven was confirmed in the multivariate analysis indicating
that the concurrent adoption did have a relationship with
transition method choice.

This was the only one of the PRB

specific variables proposed that was found to be
significant.

However, the findings concerning the other

two variables (AMEND and RETEMP) provided additional
information.

Firm maturity was not found to be

significant, which contradicted previous research.
Amending of postretirement plans was not found to be
significant to manager's choice, contrary to public
expectations, thus answering the primary research question:
there is no relationship between plan amendments and
transition method choice.
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Predictive Ability

A classification table of observed and predicted
values of the transition method
each logistic regression model

(TMETH) was constructed for
(Table 4.13).

The PLANSIZE

model correctly predicted the chosen method 86.2 percent
(169/196) of the sample firms.

A false positive rate of

17.0 percent (8/47) and a false negative rate of 12.8
percent
measure,

(19/149) were observed.

The

model's sensitivity

number of firms choosing immediate recognition as

predicted, was 94.2 percent (130/138) and the specificity
measure, number of firms

choosing to amortize as

predicted, was 67.2 percent (39/58).
The SIZE model correctly predicted the chosen method
for 85.7 percent (168/196) of the sample firms.

A false

positive rate of 18.8 percent (9/48) and a false negative
rate of 12.8 percent

(19/148) were observed.

The model's

sensitivity measuring number of firms choosing immediate
recognition that were predicted to do so, was 93.5 percent
(129/138).

The model's specificity, number of firms

choosing to amortize that were predicted to do so, was 67.2
percent

(39/58).
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TABLE 4.13
Classification Table - PLANSIZE model
Observed x Predicted
TMETH

PREDICTED

OBSERVED
Percent
Row Percent
Col. Percent
0

1

0

1

39
19 .90
67 .24
81.25

19
9 .69
32 .76
12 .84

8
4 .08
5.80
17.02

130
66. 33
94 .20
87 .25

Classification Table - SIZE model
Observed x Predicted
TMETH

PREDICTED

OBSERVED
Percent
Row Percent
Col. Percent
0

1

0

1

39
19. 90
67 .24
81.25

19
9. 69
32.76
12 .84

9
4.59
6.52
18.75

129
65.82
93 .48
87 .16
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The proportional chance criterion,

used to determine

the predictive accuracy that would exist due to pure
chance, was calculated:
CtI t = P
where

+ (1-P)

CF,

= proportional chance criteria
p = proportion of firms choosing immediate
recognition
1 -p = proportion of firms choosing delayed
recognition

This calculated criteria for the sample of 196 firms was
.583 or 58.3 percent.

The predicted accuracies of 86.2 and

85.7 percent were well above the recommended 25 percent
margin (1.25 x 58.3 = 72.9 percent),

indicating that the

models provided a better method of predicting than that
expected by chance.
Further Analysis
Multicollinearity Analysis
The existence of high correlations between the
independent variables, multicollinearity, may indicate
problems in the evaluation of the effect of an independent
variable upon the dependent variable.

To determine if

multicollinearity existed in the data collected,

a

correlation matrix using Pearson correlation coefficients
was constructed (Table 4.14).

The null hypothesis,

that

the correlation between any two variables is zero, was
tested using all nine of the variables
included).

(both size variables
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Five relationships displayed significant correlation
coefficients:

ASSET and AMEND (.19723), SIC and ASSET

(.29434), SIC and BONUS (-.14020), SIC and ADOPT
(-.39698), and PLANSIZE and BONUS
results,

(-.15717).

From these

it appears that classification of industry

(regulated vs. nonregulated) appeared to be positively
correlated to firm size, and negatively correlated to
existence of a bonus plan and early adoption of SFAS 106.
This industry variable was found to be significant,

in the

hypothesis testing, to transition method choice, however,
with the presence of these correlations, the possibility
exists that other information may be impounded in this
result.
The existence of a bonus plan was found to be
significant in univariate testing and correlation results
indicate a relationship between BONUS and industry
membership, as well as the relative size of the firm,
measured by the transition obligation/stockholder's equity.
This may indicate that firms giving bonuses tend to be
those with smaller postretirement benefit plans.

There is

also correlation between the log of total assets and
announced plan amendments.

This would possibly tend to

imply that large firms took advantage of the opportunity to
make amendments to their postretirement benefit plans.

Table 4.14
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
P-values

TMETH

BONUS

EARLY

LEV

109

AMEND

PLANSIZE

ASSET

B O NUS

.1B 18 7
.0107

EARLY

.SOS 15
.0001

.115B4
.1059

LEV

.004 10
.9546

- .0 4 9 4 1
.4916

.09280
.1958

109

.08481
.2371

-.00701
.9223

-.0 5 4 8 7
.4450

-. 0 9 8 7 6
.1685

05661
.4 306

.05362
.4554

.11219
. 1175

-.0 10 7 0
.B817

.01795
.8028

PLANSIZE

- .08064
.2 370

15717
.0278

-.03289
.6472

0377 3
. 5996

- .08002
.2649

- .08792
.2204

A S S ET

- . 17 37 4

0 1 775
.8049

-.04839
.5006

7 5181
.0001

-. 10327
.1498

.02152
.7647

-.00719
.9203

14020
.0500

-.39698

. 0001

.0001

,01244
.8626

.0 5 0 0 0
.48 6 5

-.01795
.8028

-.00513
.9431

.28615
.0001

00469
.9480

.00730
.9191

.03499
.6264

.01328
.8534

.05478
.4457

- .01352
.8508

.00945
.8955

-.01 8 8 7
.7929

AMEND

.0149
ilC

RETEMP

- .57968

SIC

-.07582
.2909
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While there are five correlation problems

(all with p-

values < .05) the multicollinearity is not considered to be
a serious problem until the correlation coefficient is
greater than .8 or .9 (Judge et al 1988).
Further examination for potential multicollinearity
problems was conducted by performing structural analyses of
the relationships between variables using the eigenvalues
of the matrix of correlation coefficients, developed from
an OLS regression'. Analysis of eigenvalues can provide an
indication of the severity of the multicollinearity
problem,

with values close to zero indicating higher

degrees of multicollinearity (Judge et al 1988).

Related

condition indices above thirty usually indicate a high
degree of multicollinearity (Judge et al 1988).
Eigenvalues ranged from .51069 to 1.56965, while
condition indices ranged from l .0 to 1.75316.

The lowest

eigenvalue shown was .51069 for condition factor eight
which also had the highest condition index.

Table 4.15

presents the results of these analyses, which indicated
that there were no multicollinearity problems within this
set of variables.

Results are reported for the PLANSIZE model.
Results were very close in both models.
R was .45 in both
and adjusted R was .43.
Eigenvalues and Condition Indices
differed by very little between models.
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Table 4.15
Multicollinearity Analysis
Number

Eigenvalue

Condition Index

1

1.56965

1.00000

2

1. 26864

1.11233

3

1.13057

1.17829

4

1.02296

1.23871

5

0.93079

1.29860

6

0.88007

1.33550

7

0.68663

1.51195

8

0.51069

1.75316

Outlier analysis
Analysis was conducted to determine if any
observations were separated from the remainder of the data
or exerted an extreme amount of influence over the model or
any of the variables.

Results of statistical analysis from

the logistic regression models were examined as the first
step in identifying outlying firms.

This was done by

observation of influence table values and iplots provided
in SAS analysis.
Hat Matrix,

Pearson residuals,

Deviance residuals,

DfBeta values, C values, Cbar values, Dif.Dev.,

and Dif. Chi Square values were used to distinguish twentyone observations with at least one outlying value

(See
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Table 4.16
Outlier Analysis

PLANSIZE modal
ASSET modal

Hot>3

Paarson
Rasid.

Dav.
R*iid.

Hat
Matrix

i]
25
32

LEV
DfBata

ADOPT
DfBata

Siza
DfBata

.8259
.2404

I 73
1 *5
1 92
[ 115
1 117

Bonus
DfBata

,7614
.8265
3.1336

.3694

,1787

1.7014
2.9525
i

2.1924
2.240?

131
133

.7970
.9241
_

130
140

.5710
.2757

151
155
160
164

-3.7647

172

-4.2699

-2.4217

176 1
170 -4,0197
~.37875
192
195
-3.7017
-' 8924

!
-2.22?0

.2741

-2.3222

.2914
.8856
I.0325

.6197
-.3600
- .3006
.2959
-,3453
->3401

!
-2.3lflfe
-2.3902

- .3472

■2933
*.2558

1
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Table 4.16 (continued)
Outlier Analysis

SIC

Df Beta

R ETE M P
DfBeta

,

Cbar

109
^ DfBeta

2 4 58

5 .4960

3 450

6 .2157

>7 345
1 . 60S9

.659 1
. 7J I J

.

14 9

:

5 , I860

IS .54 3

5.9663

16,440

14 . 663
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Table 4.16).
value,

(Seven observations had only one outlying

five had two outlying values,

four outlying values,

two had five,

two observations had
three observations

had six, one had seven and one observation had eight
outlying values.)
The firm characteristics of these twenty-one
observations were then analyzed for extreme values of the
nine variables ana their components.
analysis in shown in Table 4.17.

The results of this

Of the 21 firms with

outlying statistical values, eleven also had
characteristic values in the extreme range for at least one
of the nine variables of interest.

The last step in

identifying potential outliers was to examine all of the
196 sample firms for extreme values of the nine variables.
Comparison of these observations (statistical analysis and
extreme value search)

led to the

list of thirteen firms,

which had multiple indications in the outlier analysis
process,

to be examined as potentially influential

observations

(See Table 4.18).

First, each of these observations was deleted from the
sample individually and results were analyzed.

Then,

beginning with Observation 195 (with eight statistical
outlying indicators) combinations of observations were
deleted, adding, one at a time based on the results of the
individual analysis.

Firms with negative Stockholder's
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Table 4.17
Statistical Outlier Firm Characteristics

Obs

TMETH

LEV

25

1

.0 2 7 1 6

92

1

36.4721

11

1

13 1

1

133

1

140

0

164

0

172

0

173

0

192

0

195

0

PLAN
SIZE

ASSET

EMP

RET
EMP

SE

12.5344

9 . 5 57 4
0

.0174

-34.14

-3 - 0 243
2 9 -6 5 "
12.7963
.03 17

i

15946
.

1

4 .8756

.0038

1
i

0

Equity (See Table 4.4) were also deleted as a group.
Results of this regression are given in Appendix B.

Table

4.19 displays the differences from the full model that were
obtained when observations were deleted.
Three variables (ADOPT, 109, and SIC)were significant
in the models using the full sample.

Table 4-19 shows that

the only change involving one of these is the result that
occurs when observation 151 (Data General Corp.)

is deleted

in combination with one oi more of the other outlier
variables.

This firm had no observable outlying values of

firm characteristics, but did show several outlying
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Table 4.18
List of Outlying Firms
DBS NO

NAME
Acme Electric Corp.
Bell Industries Inc.
Data General Corp.
Lear Seating Co.
Neiman-Marcus Group Inc.
Oregon Steel Mills Inc.
Scott Paper Co.
Sprint Corp.
Wheeling Pittsburgh CP
Union Planters Corp.
United Merchants and Mfrs
USX Corp Consolidated
Vishay Intertechnology

140
22
151
164
92
172
178
117
195
131
133
25
192

statistical values

(AMEND DfBeta, Dif Dev, Dif ChiSq,

Pearson Resid., Dev Resid., and ADOPT DfBeta)
4.16).

(See Table.

When this observation was deleted alone there was

no significant change, but when deleted in combination with
others,

109 became significant at alpha = .10,

at alpha = .05.

instead of

Variable 109 is a dummy variable

indicating concurrent adoption of SFAS 109 with SFAS 106.
Since no outlying values are possible for this variable,
this observation could not have exerted extreme influence
on the variable itself, so the effect must occur somewhere
in the other variables in the model.
analysis,

From observational

there does not appear to be a visible explanation
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for this change of significance level of this particular
variable.
Several changes occurred among the previously non
significant variables as shown in Table 4.19.

When

observation 133 was deleted, both alone and when deleted
along with observation 195 (deleting other observations in
addition did not change the effect), BONUS became
significant at alpha = .10.

BONUS also became significant

at the .10 level when firms with negative Stockholder's
Equity were deleted.

Observation 133 represents United

Merchants and Mfrs. and observation 195 is Wheeling
Pittsburgh CP.

Observation 133 had one of the negative

values of Stockholders' Equity ehich also resulted in a
negative value of LEV.

Thsi observation did show an

outlying value of the BONUS Df beta of .7970 (PLANSIZE
model) and .8141 (ASSET model),

indicating that there was

influence exerted on the variable by this observation.
Observation 195 did not have any outlying values
relating to BONUS, but did have extreme values of Pearson
Residual, Dev. Resid, ADOPT Dfbeta, AMEND DfBeta,

C Bar,

Dif Dev, and Dif Chi Square (7 outlying values).
Observation 133 appeared to be the more influential, but in
combinations with other outliers the effect changed more
often when 195 was also deleted.

The effect of this result
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Table 4.19
Results of Outlier Analysis

Observ.
Number

Signif.
Variable

109
151
a lone

no

in
comb.

sig.
. 10

BONUS

Insignif.

Variables

LEV

AMEND

RETEMP

change
at

164
alone

+

in
comb.
133
a lone

sig.
. 10

at

in
comb.
W/ 195

sig.
.10

at

25
a lone

no
change

in
comb,
w t 195

sig.
. 10

Neg.
SE
195
a lone
in
comb.
w/ 151,
25

Sig.
. 10

at

at

no

change

1

1
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is to confirm the questionable result of the univariate
analysis.
Another variable, RETEMP, became significant at the
.10 level when observation 25 (USX Corp Consolidated) was
deleted in combinations including observation 195 (Wheeling
Pittsburgh C P ) . Deleting either of these observations alone
caused no changes, but the two deleted together and
combined with other outlying firms caused the change in
significance of RETEMP.

Observation 25 had the highest

value of RETEMP,

indicating over twelve and one

12.534,

half retirees for every employee, while 195 had a RETEMP
value of o.

The RETEMP Dfbeta of observation 25 is also an

extreme value, while observation 195 did not have an have
an outlying value of Dfbeta.

There were other observations

in the sample with RETEMP values of 0, but the high values
of the other outlier statistics for 195 indicates that
there is some level of influence exerted.
This result is an important one to this research,
since the full model did not indicate any significance for
the RETEMP variable,

in contradiction of previous research.

When the outliers are deleted, RETEMP became significant at
the .10 level.

This result suggests that plans with a

higher level of retirees to employees tended to delay
amortization.

.10 level.

This confirms Hypothesis Six at the alpha =
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The variable LEV changed signs from negative to
positive when observation 164 (Lear Seating Co.) was
deleted,

both alone and in combination with other

observations.

The variable did not change in level of

insignificance however.

This observation had a high

positive value of LEV, the debt ratio, but not the highest
of the sample.

(Observation 92, Neiman Marcus, had the

highest, but no changes in results were observed when
deleted from the sample.) The LEV Df beta was also high for
the PLANSIZE model, but again, not the highest of all
observations.

Observation 164 also had high statistical

values of BONUS Dfbeta, Intercept Dfbeta, C Bar, and Dif
Dev.

Even though, the deletion of this observation caused

a change in the sign, indicating that the effect of high
debt was positive (opposite to prediction), there was still
a lack of significance of the variable.
AMEND also changed signs from negative to positive
when outlying firms were deleted.

Observation 195

(Wheeling Pittsburgh CP), deleted alone, caused no change,
but in combinations including 25 (USX Corp) and 151
General Corp) the sign change was evidenced.

AMEND,

(Data
a

dummy variable, had no extreme values, but Observations 195
and 25 did have extreme values of RETEMP as well as several
high values in outlier statistics.
high values of AMEND Dfbeta

Observation 151 had

(See Table 4.16).

The change
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of sign confirmed the predicted direction,

suggesting that

firms amending plans tended to amortize, however,

since the

result is not significant, no conclusions can be drawn.
When all five of the above listed observations were
deleted,

151, 164, 133, 25, and 195, the results were as

discussed above, with one exception.

Observation 133

changed the significance level of the BONUS variable only
when deleted alone and with 195.

Since three other

variables were deleted, BONUS was not statistically
significant.
Discussion
Table 4.20 presents the results of all tests of the
research hypotheses. All models tested were shown to be
significantly significant at the .0001 level.

Three

variables were shown to be influential at .05 level for the
full sample:

ADOPT,

109 and SIC.

ADOPT and 109 had signs

which were in conformance with expectations, thus
supporting Hypotheses Four and Seven. When specific
outliers were deleted 109 was no longer statistically
significant .05 but was significant at .10.
SIC had an unexpected sign, which refuted Hypothesis
Five, but the significance of the variable indicated that
regulatory status of firm was important to the transition
decision.

Instead of choosing immediate recognition,

Table 4.20
Results of Hypotheses Testing

Hyp

R es u l t s

P re di c t i o n

(full sample)

llnvar iate
T h e e x i s t e n c e of a n i n c o m e b a s e d b o n u s - p l a n is r e l a t e d
to t r a n s i t i o n method choice.

H ig h l e v e r a g e is r e l a t e d
c h o i c e of t h e d e l a y e d
r e c o g n i t i o n method.

to

L a r g e f i r m s i t e is r e l a t e d to
t h e c h o i c e of t h e i m m e d i a t e
recognition method.

E a r l y a d o p t i o n is r e l a t e d to
t he c h o i c e of t h e i m m e d i a t e
r e c o g n i t i o n method.

confirmed

(lot c o n f i rmed

Hot confirmed
(Siq* , n o t as
pred.)

M a t u r i t y of a f i r m ' s w o r k
f or ce is t e l a t e d to the
t r a n s i t i o n m e t h o d choice.

(lot c o n f i r m e d

C o n c u r r e n t a d o p t i o n 109 is
r e l a t e d to th e c h o i c e of
the i m m e d i a t e r e c o g n i t i o n
method

(lot c o n f i r m e d

of

p o s t -r e 11rement

Not

Mu 11 ivar i a t e

(lot c o n f i r m e d

C o nf i r m e d * •

N o t c o n f ir m e d

Not c o n f i r m e d

No t

No t

confirmed

Not confirmed
(Siq*, but s i g n
in o p p ,dir)

Hot C o n f i r m e d
(Siq. but
s i g n in o p p dir)

Not

C o n f ir m e d * *

confirmed

C o n f ir med*

C o n f i r me d* *

(lot c o n t irmed

confirmed

confirmed

C o n f irmed*

Confirmed*

Conf i r m e d •

h e g u l a t i o n of i n d u s t r y i s '
r e l a t e d t o t h e c h o i c e of t h e
immediate r e c o g n i t i o n method.

Adoption

H u 1t iv a r i ate

C o n f i rm e d *

N ot

(Out 1 iers D e l e t e d )

No t

c on f i r m e d

b e n e f i t p l a n a m e n d m e n t s is
r e l a t e d t o t h e c h o i c e of t h e
immediate r e c o g n i t i o n method.
s iqn

1

1 leant

at

.05

**

significant

at

.10
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regulated firms had a tendency to choose amortization.
This unexpected result could possibly be explained by the
fact that many regulatory agencies were in the process of
decisions to allow firms (especially utilities) to pass
along costs or to adjust rates to accommodate the
transition obligation.
Observation of the signs on all variables revealed
some interesting and unexpected , but insignificant
relationships.

PLANSIZE and ASSET, the two size measures

had opposite signs.

PLANSIZE had a negative sign, which

indicated that when the transition obligation/equity ratio
was large, a firm chose to amortize.

ASSET had a positive

sign which denoted that a firm with a large amount of
assets chose to recognize immediately.
LEV had the predicted negative sign, which indicated
that a firm with a large debt/equity ratio would choose to
amortize.

When specific outliers were deleted,

the sign

changed to positive, which revealed that certain
observations in the DR group had been exerting influence on
this variable.

The positive sign for the remaining model

denoted that high debt ratios would cause a company to
immediately recognize, an unpredicted, but not
statistically significant, directional relationship.
AMEND also changed signs when certain observations
were removed.

In the full model AMEND had a negative sign
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which was opposite to the expectations that firms with plan
amendments chose to immediately recognize.

After the

influential observations were deleted, the sign changed to
positive confirming what had been expected, however, with
insignificant results.
Two variables did not have hypothetically predicted
signs, BONUS and RETEMP.

The results of the regression

indicated that the presence of an incentive based bonus
plan had a positive relationship to the choice to
immediately recognize.

The ratio of retiree/employees had

an inverse relationship to the decision to immediately
recognize the transition obligation.

Neither of these

variables was significant for the regressions using the
full sample, but when specific outliers were removed both
became significant at .10 level.
These results confirm that the existence of incomebased bonus plans and the ratio of retirees to employees
were significant to the transition method choice.

The

sign for BONUS was positive indicating that firms with
plans chose to recognize immediately, possibly supporting
the "big bath" theory.

The sign for RETEMP was negative

which meant that firms with a high ratio of retirees to
employees chose to amortize.

This suggests that those

firms which have high costs due to large number of
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retirees,

as opposed to future costs for current employees,

sought to delay recognition.
In the final analysis, after related outliers had been
deleted,

five variables were significant.

Two

(ADOPT, SIC)

at the .05 level and three (BONUS, RETEMP, and 109) at the
.10 level.

Four hypotheses were confirmed: One,

and Seven (See Table 4.20).

Four, Six,

Hypothesis Five was not

confirmed as the sign was in the wrong direction.
The "big bath" theory was supported at the .10 level,
but the income-decreasing effect of SFAS 106 did not
necessarily support the traditional bonus theory.
theory was not supported,
political cost theory.
proxies,

The debt

nor was the size aspect of the

However, other political cost

industry regulation and early adoption were

confirmed as significant in the transition method choice
decision.
Two of the PRB specific hypotheses were confirmed:
and Seven.

The variables RETEMP and 109 were significant

at the .10 level.

109 was significant at .05 using the

full sample, before outliers were deleted.
AMEND,

Six

The variable

representing plan amendments was not significant.

With these results, this research is able to introduce new
data confirming the importance of some information to a
manager's transition method choice.

The fear that managers
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would use the choice to justify plan amendments is not
confirmed in this study.
Summary
Chapter four contained the results of the research
study.

The first section described the sample selection

process.

A final sample of 196 firms was collected, of

which 58 chose to delay recognition of the transition
obligation by amortizing over a future period and 138 chose
to immediately recognize the obligation in the year of
adoption.

The next section presented the results of

univariate analysis of the independent variables.

Three

variables were found to be significant:

BONUS, SIC, and

ADOPT (see Table 4.8).

indicating a

Hypothesis One,

relationship between the existence of a bonus plan and
transition method choice; Hypothesis Four,

indicating a

relationship between early adoption and transition method
choice and Hypothesis Five,

indicating a relationship

between regulatory status of industry and transition method
choice were supported.
The third section contained the results of the
logistic regression models.

Three variables were found to

be significant for the full sample:
(see Table 4.15).

SIC, ADOPT and 109

The model yielded support for the

Hypotheses Four, a relationship between early adoption and
transition method choice and Seven,

indicating a
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relationship between concurrent adoption of SFAS 109 and
transition method choice.
to be significant,

The industry grouping was found

but as the sign was opposite to

expectations, a relationship was indicated, but not in the
predicted direction.

The models were found to be

significant at the .0001 level and there was not a problem
with multicollinearity.

The fourth section examined the

predictive ability of the model, which was greater than
could be achieved by chance.
one variable,
.05.

When outliers were deleted,

109, became significant at .10 instead of

Two variables, BONUS and RETEMP, which were not

significant with the full sample, became significant at

. 10.
This research tested the effect of three PRB related
variables on managers' transition method choice.

RETEMP

and 109 were shown to be significant at alpha = .10 when
influential observations were deleted.
was not significant to the model.

The variable AMEND

Firms did not choose

immediate recognition and announce amendments to their
postretirement plans within a two year time period.

When

outliers were deleted, the sign was positive, but the
variable was still not significant.

The answer to the

primary research question "Is there a significant
relationship between plan amendments and the transition
method choice?"

was found to be "no".

CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
This chapter contains the summary and conclusions of
this research study.
the study.
findings,

The first section is an overview of

The second section contains the expected
followed by the reported results of the study in

the third section.

The fourth section includes the

conclusions and the fifth section is a discussion of the
limitations of the study.

The last section examines some

possible areas to expand this research.
Overview
SFAS 106 was issued in 1990 and required to be adopted
by most US firms in the fiscal year beginning after 1992.
Firms had a choice of two methods of recognizing the
transition obligation.

The obligation was recognized

immediately in its entirety as a cumulative effect of an
accounting change in the year of adoption or was amortized
over a future period, not to exceed 20 years.

The purpose

of this study was to examine the factors which motivated
managers' choices of transition method.

The primary

research question was "Is there a significant relationship
between plan amendments and SFAS 106 transition method
choice?
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Specifically,

firm specific characteristics were

examined to determine if there was a significant
relationship to the transition method decision.

Several

variables were used which had previously been shown to be
significant in management choice studies, as well as some
variables specific to the question of postretirement
benefits.

Eight hypotheses were presented to test each of

the firm

specific characteristics.

The primary question of

interest

in this study relating to the adoption of SFAS 106

was to determine if there was a significant relationship
between the transition method choice and decisions to amend
postretirement benefit plans.
A sample of 196 firms was selected from COMPUSTAT and
NAARS data sources.

Eight hypotheses were tested using two

logistic models.
H,: The presence of an income-based bonus plan
is significant to the choice of transition method
in adopting SFAS 106. (BONUS)
H : Firms with high leverage will choose the
delayed recognition method of adopting SFAS 106.
(LEV)
H,:
Large firms will choose to immediately
recognize the OPEB transition obligation.
(PLANSIZE and ASSET)
H 4: Firms which adopt SFAS 106 early will choose
to immediately recognize the OPEB transition
obligation.
(ADOPT)
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H : Firms in regulated or politically sensitive
industries will choose to immediately recognize
the OPEB transition method in adopting SFAS 106.
(SIC)
H, : Work force maturity will be a significant
factor in a manager's choice of transition method
in the adoption of SFAS 106. (RETEMP)
H.: Firms adopting SFAS 109 in the same year as
SFAS 106 will use the immediate recognition
method in adopting SFAS 106.
(109)
H lt: Firms which have amended their nonpension
postretirement benefit plan will use the
immediate recognition method of adopting SFAS
106. (AMEND)
Each hypothesis was represented by one variable (as shown
in parentheses above) except for Hypothesis Three which was
tested using two variables in separate regressions.
Statistical analysis was conducted to determine the
statistical significance of each variable and the
predictive ability of the model.
Expected Findings
As discussed in Chapter Two,

five of the variables

included in this research had previously been shown to be
significant in management choice studies.

The existence of

bonus plans had been shown to be significant to managers as
they seek to maximize their own wealth in their decision
making.

Incentive based bonus plans were expected to have

a significant effect on the transition method choice,

but
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the direction of this effect was not determined, thus a
two-tailed hypothesis was presented.
Size was represented by two different variables 1) a
ratio of the transition obligation to stockholder's equity
and 2) log of total assets.

Firms with greater size were

expected to select immediate recognition since they were
more likely to be able to afford the large write-off while
also sending a positive signal to the market.

The presence

of debt had also been shown to be a significant factor in
management choice decisions.

A high debt ratio, non-

current liabilities to stockholder's equity was expected to
influence a firm to amortize the transition obligation.
Early adoption had been shown to have a significant
relationship to manager's choices in adopting new
standards.

In this case, it was expected that firms

adopting early would choose to immediately recognize the
transition obligation.

Industry membership had also played

an important role in adoption of new standards.

Firms in

regulated industries were expected to immediately recognize
the transition obligation.
Issue specific variables, AMEND,

109 and RETEMP were

placed in this model to extend the research into areas
which had not been previously examined.

Evidence of plan

amendments was expected to coincide with immediate
recognition of the transition obligation.

Concurrent
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recognition of SFAS 109 also was expected to have a
positive relationship, since SFAS 109 allowed a large tax
benefit which could offset the high cost of SFAS 106
adoption.

The ratio of retirees to employees was expected

to be significant, but the direction of the relationship
was undetermined prior to testing the model.
Result*
Univariate analysis of the independent variables
indicated that three of the nine variables, BONUS, SIC, and
ADOPT, were able to differentiate between transition method
(IR and DR) groups.

The null hypothesis of no difference

between groups was not rejected for ASSET, LEV,
PLANSIZE and RETEMP.

109, AMEND,

These univariate and frequency tests

revealed initial support for the bonus, early adoption,

and

industry hypotheses.
Two logistic models were tested for explanatory value.
Examination of the correlation tables using all variables
revealed that there was a possibility that
multicollinearity might be present.

However,

further

analysis of eigenvalues and condition indices did not
indicate a problem in this area.

Goodness of fit tests

indicated that both models were statistically significant.
Regression results, using the full sample of 196
firms, yielded three significant variables in both models:
ADOPT,

109 and SIC.

The signs for ADOPT and 109 were in

157
conformance with the expectations and thus supported
hypotheses four and seven.

While industry membership was

significant to the model, the sign was opposite to the
expectations.

Signs of PLANSIZE and AMEND were opposite to

the expected signs, but these variables were not
significant. Using the alternate size proxy, ASSET yielded
a positive sign, which had been predicted, but the variable
was not significant.
been predicted,

The two variables whose signs had not

BONUS (positive) and RETEMP (negative) were

also not significant to the model.

Both models were shown

to have significant predictive value.
Outliers were eliminated and the models re-evaluated.
The variable 109 was significant at .10 level in this
reduced sample, but ADOPT and SIC were still shown to have
statistical significance at the .05 level.

Two other

variables, BONUS and RETEMP became significant at the .10
level when specific observations were deleted.
changes were observed:

Two sign

LEV and AMEND both changed to a

positive sign when certain outliers were deleted.
Conclusions
Hypotheses One, Four, Six, Seven and Eight were
confirmed in this study.

The choice to adopt early was

seen as a political cost issue.

Firms adopting standards

early often attempted to send a signal of fiscal health to
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the market.

This result supported results of previous

research on early adoption and SFAS 106.
Adoption of SFAS 109 in the same period as SFAS 106
was expected,

as firms would seek to use the tax benefit

available in adopting SFAS 109 to offset the large cost of
adopting SFAS 106.

This relationship had not been

extensively examined in management choice literature since
it is specific to this issue.

The results confirmed that a

positive relationship existed between the two adoptions.
The existence of a bonus plan was significant when
related outliers were excluded.

This did not support the

traditional bonus plan theory that managers who have
incentive based bonus plans will seek to maximize income,
but did possibly lend credence to the "big bath" theory.
The ratio of retirees to employees was also shown to be
significant.

This indicated that firms with higher number

of retirees tended to delay recognition, possibly as a
result of higher costs compared to those with more current
employees.
Industry membership was also significant to the
management transition method decision, but the direction
was opposite of the expected direction.

Regulated firms

had been expected to use immediate recognition since they
were assumed to be exposed to higher political costs.
Theoretically,

firms with high political costs seek to
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reduce income, thus recognizing the transition obligation
immediately would yield the greater income reduction.
Examination of the footnotes of regulated firms in the
sample revealed that many firms, especially utilities chose
to amortize, possibly because the regulatory bodies were
considering ways to pass on the costs to customers over
time.
Lack of significant regression results for size
variables and debt ratios were contrary to the findings of
many previous researchers,

as discussed in Chapter Two.

This result may have been due to the unique aspects of SFAS
106, the income-decreasing effect and the magnitude of the
transition obligation.

The signs of these variables also

did not confirm previous expectations.
had signs as predicted.

Only LEV and ASSET

However, the sign for LEV changed

when one influential observation was deleted.
Only one issue specific variable, AMEND, was not
significant to the model, but evaluation of the sign of the
parameter provided information relevant to the
relationships.

AMEND was expected to have a positive

relationship to the choice to immediately recognize.
was not confirmed.

This

Firms amending their postretirement

plans did not indicate a preference for immediate
recognition.

This contradicted the fears and suggestions

made by many FASB observers who felt that the large write-
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off afforded by SFAS 106 would be used by companies to
reduce employee benefits.
This study provided several interesting pieces of
information to add to the management choice literature.
The primary research issue, to determine if there was a
relationship between transition method choice and plan
amendments, was examined and no significant relationship
was found.

The relationships supported were those between

the transition method choice and early adoption,

industry

regulation, concurrent adoption of SFAS 109, the existence
of bonus plans and the ratio of retirees to employees.
Limitations
Several limitations common to management choice
studies were present in this research.

Proxies were chosen

to represent factors such as debt covenants, size of firms,
etc.

There are many ratios and financial numbers which

could be used to measure these factors.

The proxies which

were selected for this study were supported by previous
research as discussed in Chapters Two and Three, however
limitations due to the selection of the proxies may be
present,

as results confirmed a lack of significance of

several variables in the model.
The use of a logistic model had many advantages,
there were also some issues that must be considered.
and Rasp (1991)

but
Stone

found that sample sizes of 200 or more are
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necessary to ensure that nominal and empirical error rates
will not be different.
reduced to 196 firms.

The sample size for this study was
Aldrich and Nelson {1984)

indicated

that when bias exists due to a small sample size, the ttests will have an anticonservatively biased result.
Sample selection, while done on a random basis, was
limited to firms that were publicly traded and reported on
COMPUSTAT.

Firms that had incomplete data were also

excluded from the sample.

The results of this study,

therefore, may not be generalizable to a greater population
of firms.
Future Research
This study attempted to combine traditionally proven
accounting measures with some new and issue specific
variables to extend the previous accounting research.
There are other considerations which have not been included
in this model.

Issues such as income variation during the

period of SFAS 106 adoption could have significant
influence on the adoption decision.
such as bankruptcy,

Also unique issues

initial public offerings and other firm

specific information could be placed in the model to
determine what relationships exist.
Sample selection could be improved with the addition
of a broader spectrum of firms.
generalizabi1ity of the results.

This would improve the
Also a larger sample size
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would alleviate problems with the logistic model.

The

sample size could be greatly expanded if information was
made more readily available.

While much information is

easily acquired on computer data bases, some key figures
relating to employee status is available only in government
documents or directly from company offices.

A potential

area of development for future researchers would be in
improving the availability of information, possibly by
expanding the current data banks or developing new ones.
This research project will continue to be developed
and refined.

More variables will be added to the model and

different statistical analyses will be performed.

Further

details of variables such as: break-down of regulated
industries, break-down of plan amendments, and bonus plan
details will be considered.

As new standards are released

in the postretirement/ postemployment arena, this research
can be applied and used to evaluate the adoption process.
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APPENDIX A
Sample Companies bv Industry
Companies classified as non-reaulated industry
Company

SIC

Amax Gold Inc
Battle Mountain Gold Co
Rio Algom Ltd
USX Corp Consolidated
Mitchel1 Energy and Dev
Enron Corp
Reading and Bates Corp
Sonat Offshore Drilling Inc
Dravo Corp
Campbell Soup Co
Ralston Purina Group
Tootsie Roll inds
Anheuser-Busch Cos Inc
Seagram Co Ltd
American Brands Inc
Culbro Corp
United Merchant and Mfrs
Georgia-Pacific Corp
Interlake Corp
Lear Seating Co
Domtar Inc
Union Camp Corp
Temple Inland Inc
Federal Paper Board Co
Bemis Co
Nashua Corp
James River Corp of Virginia
Scott Paper Co
Dow Jones and Co
Knight-Ridder Inc
Media General
Tribune Co
Washington Post
Houghton Mifflin Co
American Business Products
Deluxe Corp
(table cont'd)

1041
1041
1094
1311
1311
1321
13 81
1381
14 00
203 2
2051
2064
2082
2085
2111
2121
2200
2436
2452
2531
2 621
2621
2631
2631
2671
2672
2676
2676
27n
27ll
2711
2711
2711
2731
2761
2782
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Dow Chemical
CBI Industries
Rohm and Haas Co
olin Corp
Syntex Corp
Warner-Lambert Co
AL Laboratories, Inc
Proctor and Gamble Co
Helene Curtis Inds
Sterling Chemicals Inc
Arco Chemical Co
IMC Fertilizer Group
Betz Laboratories
Loctite Corp
Amoco Co
Ashland Oil
Crown Central Petroleum
Diamond Shamrock Inc
Du Pont (El) du Nemours
Mobil Corp
Murphy Oil Corp
Valero Energy Corp
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co
Tredegar Industries Inc
O'Sullivan Corp
Wolverine World Wide
PPG Industries Inc
Lone Star Industries
Raytech Corp
Oregon Steel Mills Inc
Wheeling Pittsburgh CP
National-Standard Co
Carpenter Technology
Aluminum Co of America
Reynolds Metals
Newmont Mining Corp
RMI Titanium Co
Alumax Inc
Crown Cork and Seal Co Inc
Gilette Co
Stanley Works
RB&W Corp
Material Sciences Corp
BMC Industries Inc
Crane Co
(table cont'd)

2800
2810
2821
2822
2834
2834
2834
2840
2844
2860
2869
2874
2890
2891
2911
2911
2911
2911
2911
2911
2911
2911
3011
3081
3089
3143
3211
3241
3292
3312
3312
3315
3321
3334
3334
3339
3350
3365
3411
3420
3423
3452
3470
3479
3490
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Commercial Intertech
Brunswick Corp
Clark Equipment Co
Dover Corp
Monarch Machine Tool Co
Federa1-Mogul Corp
Ingersoll-Rand Co
Dressar Industries Inc
Ceridian Corp
Data General Corp
Diebold Inc
Smith Corona Corp
Nortek Inc
Acme Electric Corp
Whirlpool Corp
Harris Corp
Motorola Inc
Vishay Intertechnology
Texas Instruments Inc
AMP Inc
Charter Power Systems
Arc International Corp
United Industrial Corp
Chrysler Corp
Hastings Mfg Co
Mark IV Industries Inc
Schwitzer Inc
Standard Products Co
Boeing Co
McDonnell Douglas Corp
General Electric Co
Teledyne Inc
EDO Corp
Harley-Davidson Inc
Huffy Corp
Martin Marietta Corp
Litton Industries Inc
Johnson Controls Inc
Genrad Inc
Perkin-Elmer Corp
Allen Group
Baxter International Inc
Everest and Jennings
Allergan Inc
Eastman Kodak Co
{table cont'd)

3492
3519
3531
3534
3541
3562
3562
3563
3571
3571
3578
3579
3585
3620
3633
3633
3663
3670
3674
3678
3692
3679
3699
3711
3714
3714
3714
3714
3721
3721
3724
3724
3728
3751
3751
3764
3812
3822
3825
3826
3829
3841
3842
3851
3861
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Mattel Inc
Genuine Parts Co
Bell Industries Inc
Barnes Group Inc
AAR Group
Fleming Companies Inc
Supervalu Inc
Univar Corp
Neiman-Marcus Group Inc
Teppco Partners
Melville Corp
Morrison Restaurants Inc
Tiffany and Co
Reynolds and Reynolds

3942
5013
5065
5072
5080
5141
5141
5161
5311
5411
5651
5812
5944
7373

Companies classified as regulated industry
Santa Fe Pacific Corp
American President Cos LTD
Kirby Corp
Federal Express Corp
AT&T Corp
GTE Corp
Southern New England Telecomm
Southwestern Bell Corp
Sprint Corp
Alltel Corp
American Electric Power
Commonwealth Edison
FPL Group Inc
General Public Utilities
Kansas City Power and Light
Ohio Edison Co
TNP Enterprises Inc
United Illuminating Co
Unitil Corp
Questar Corp
Southern Union
United Cities Gas Co
Nicor Inc
Consolidated Edison of NY
Delmarva Power and Light
Florida Public Utilities Co
Interstate Power Co
(table cont'd)

4011
4412
4449
4513
4813
4813
4813
4813
4813
4813
4911
4911
4911
4911
4911
4911
4911
4911
4911
4923
4923
4923
4924
4931
4931
4931
4931
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Long island Lighting
Montana Power Co
Northern States Power (MN)
Pacific Gas and Electric
San Diego Gas and Electric
Sierra Pacific Res
Western Resources Inc
Wisconsin Energy Corp
California Water Service Co
SJW Corp
Southern California Water Co
First Bank System Inc
Hibernia Corp
Chemical Financial Corp
SPS Technologies Inc
NBD Bancorp Inc
PNC Bank Corp
Union Planters Corp
Zions Bancorporation
Bankamerica Corp
Central Fidelity Banks Inc
Citizens Bancshares Inc
Crestar Financial Corp
Northern Trust Corp
SFFED Corp
Southtrust Corp
Suntrust Banks Inc
UJB Financial Corp
Wells Fargo and Co

4931
4931
4931
4931
4931
4931
4931
4931
4941
4941
4941
6021
6021
6022
6452
6712
6712
6712
6712
6712
6712
6712
6712
6712
6712
6712
6712
6712
6712
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Appendix B
Logistic Regression Results
PLANSIZE Model
Variable
BONUS

(Negative SE firms deleted)

Predicted
sign
undef ined

Parameter
estimate
1.9410

Chi-square
(p-value)
3.0992
( .0783)**

PLANSIZE

+

-0.0407

ADOPT

+

2.5113

LEV

-

109

+

1 .3791

AMEND

+

-0.2066

.1666
(.6831)

SIC

+

-2.6606

30.7768
(.0001)*

-0.2353

1.7193
( .1898)

RETEMP

undef ined

* S i g n i f i c a n t at alpha< .05
** S i g n i f i c a n t at a l p h a < .10

-0.0157

.6170
( .4319)
20.9329
( .0001)*
.0364
( .8486)
7.0062
(.0081)*
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ASSET Model
Variable

BONUS
ASSET

(Negative SE firms deleted)

Predicted
sign
undefined
+

ADOPT

Parameter
estimate
1 .9639
0.00849

Chi-square
(p-value)
3.2456
(.0716)**
.0235
{ .8782)

2 .5149

21.0405
(.0001)*

LEV

-

-0.0258

.0544
(.8156)

109

+

1.4448

7.6318
(.0057)*

AMEND

+

-0.1758

.1222
(.7267)

SIC

+

-2.6665

24.3104
(.0001)*

-0.2381

1.7675
( .1837)

RETEMP

undef ined

♦significant at alpha<.05
**significant at alphac.10
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Appendix C
Categories of Announced Amendments
Increased cost sharing
Increased contributions by future retirees
Caps on employer contributions
Elimination of benefits to certain classes of retirees or
employees
Use of Preventive/Managed Care
Change of benefits
Medicare Integration
Managed indemnity measures
Caps on benefits
Linking benefits to number of years of service
Change of eligibility requirements
Increased lifetime maximum
Reduced annual maximum out of pocket expense
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